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ABSTRACT:
From the boom of the 1980's to the crash of the 90's, fundamental changes have
occurred in the real estate industry. The banking industry was the first to be thrown into
a tailspin and future generations of taxpayers will be bear the cost of funding the
government bailout of the savings and loan industry. Many insurance companies,
investment banking houses and pension funds are reeling with similar trouble, but these
institutional real estate investors will be left to their own devices to deal with their
troubled loans and equity assets.
The emphasis now is on workouts and asset management rather than new
business. To effectively meet the challenges presented in the current volatile real estate
environment, firms must be able to effectively redeploy their skills and resources. This
thesis outlines strategic and structural considerations that these institutional investment
firms must face as they adapt to the changes that have occurred in the real estate market.
Current assessments of the institutional real estate investment community and of the life
insurance industry's investment in real estate are included as background material.
A discussion of organizational learning, structure and obstacles to change precede
an examination of two firms from the insurance industry that have experienced different
amounts of real estate trouble in their respective portfolios. Equitable Real Estate
Investment Management Inc. and the Travelers Realty Investment Company are analyzed
against a framework for organizational structure and organizational learning to assess
each firm's ability to manage the process of change.
A comparative analysis of each firms' strategy and structure is presented in the
last chapter and the thesis concludes with a brief list of recommendations that are
applicable to all institutional real estate investors:
- Institutional real estate investors should be more proactive in how they approach
organizational change;
- They need to give their employees the ability to participate in a regular planning
process;
. They need to expect a healthy level of failure; and
. They should make higher-order organizational learning a strategic priority.
Thesis Supervisor: Gloria Schuck
Title: Lecturer, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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Chapter One
STRATEGIES AND STRUCTURES FOR INSTITUTIONAL
REAL ESTATE INVESTORS WITH TROUBLED ASSETS
CHAPTER ONE
BACKGROUND AND DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM:
The time to be a real estate developer was in the early and mid-1980's. Capital
was plentiful, loans were easy to obtain and most major markets were booming. The
deregulation of the banking industry--combined with other trends in interests rates and
asset securitization--opened the floodgates for real estate loans and equity investments.
Institutional lenders and investors jumped on a bandwagon that poured hundreds of
billions of dollars of new capital into the real estate development business. This money,
however, was too abundant and the capital often flowed indiscriminately into inflated,
marginally viable real estate deals.
Investments were made with little sophisticated consideration of the market
viability of the underlying assets; deals were done and money was exchanged at times
simply to generate transactions that produced fees for both lenders and developers. The
intangible financial aspects of the real estate development business overwhelmed the
bricks and mortar reality of construction and market demand. Savings and loans,
investment banks, insurance companies and pension funds poured capital into the real
estate development industry as lenders and investors saw the potential for returns that
exceeded all other types of investments. Pension funds, for instance, expecting yields in
excess of 13% provided about $50 billion in new capital to the real estate industry from
1980 to 1985.1 Another $50 billion was invested by the pension funds from 1985 to 1990
even though expected yields dropped to 10.2% during this time.2 The total estimated
$100 billion that the pensions now have invested in real estate, while only about three
percent to five percent of their total assets, still represents a potentially huge liability.
1 Hemmerick, Steve, "Real estate may drop 15% more," Pensions & Investments, April 27, 1992,
p.35.
2 Ibid.
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During the boom of the 1980's, however, it was possible to make money in real
estate "development" without actually building anything or producing an income-
generating project. Loans were made and projects were built--many on sheer
speculation--merely for the sake of generating the associated transaction fees. Lenders
and investors, realizing that there were profits to be made simply by doing such
transactions, viewed the seemingly ever-expanding real estate markets of the mid-1980's
as license to push money out the door:
... whenever investors are swamped with funds and are rewarded
for placing them, they will keep on placing them regardless of the
prudence of the deals involved. .. Jf lending officers swamped with money
can't make good deals, they will make bad ones; if they can't make bad
ones, they will make terrible ones; if they can't make terrible ones, they
will make horrible ones-but they will make deals. 3
The opportunity to acquire capital and build was enticing to anyone who ever dreamed of
becoming a real estate developer-competence was not a prerequisite. Anecdotal stories
abound that tell of how the continued climb in prices and rental rates compensated for the
most egregious business errors. Real estate development appeared to be a no-lose
proposition.
When the institutions ran short of capital to lend, they boosted their cash flow by
issuing bonds and guaranteed investment contracts (GICs) that paid high interest rates,
but allowed lenders to raise the desired additional capital. This additional capital was
then loaned or invested in real estate deals that promised to earn even higher returns-and
associated fees. The interest rates paid on these GICs and other similar corporate
obligations were partially a reflection of the issuing company's investor credit rating.
During the boom years, reported yields and profits kept most institutional real estate
investors' credit ratings high.
3 Downs, Anthony, "What Have We Learned From the 1980s Experience?," Salomon Brothers
Real Estate Investment Report, July, 1992, p.2 .
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Capital, therefore, was easy to raise and the gold rush of lending and investing
continued in high gear. Those in the banking and real estate development industry that
warned of over-financing and impending doom were drowned out by the din of money
changing hands. Real estate developers and institutional investors continued to leverage
their long-term futures for short-term gains and an artificial inflationary bubble was
created that sent real estate prices and rental rates to new heights. By the late 1980's,
however, most markets were overbuilt and most institutional lenders, investors and
developers were overexposed. The infrastructure supporting unprecedented growth in the
real estate capital markets was dangerously thin.
Then the economy stumbled.
The stock market crashed in October 1987 signaling that serious problems in the
general economy and capital markets were already afoot; the climb in real estate prices
and rental rates slowed, stalled or started to fall; and real estate values across the board
began a precipitous drop:
...investors are not always swayed by objective evidence--even
overwhelming evidence if it leads to conclusions that contradict their
immediate interests as perceived by the "herd." Evidence of overbuilding
in office and other markets was overwhelming by 1987, and probably even
earlier. By 1987, the national office-space vacancy rate--which was under
5% in 1981--had exceeded 19% for three years running. Yet banks
ccelrated their investments in new construction loans in 1988 and 1989.
Even long-term investors continued to buy real estate at rather high
prices, although effective rents were falling sharply.4
As the markets continued to soften in the late 1980's, marginal projects couldn't
produce enough income to meet their debt-service. Many projects that were built on
speculation remained virtually empty. Real estate prices and rental rates fell even further
as a national recession settled over the country, the Gulf War ensued, and market demand
Page 7
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began a spiraling descent. In some places the fall was slow but steady; in others, markets
went into relative freefall.
What began as a trickle of troubled real estate loans and investments soon became
a deluge. The amount of asset-based loan defaults began to overwhelm the banking
industry, particularly the savings and loans. As the trouble mounted, lenders faced ever-
increasing numbers of defaults and foreclosures that swelled REO (real estate owned)
portfolios and threatened the solvency of many institutions. Under the weight of too
many bad real estate loans, many thrifts failed. The Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)
was formed in 1989 to help bailout the savings and loan industry as an unprecedented
number of thrifts became insolvent. The banking industry, however, represented just the
tip of the iceberg. Insurance companies and pension funds scrambled to find ways to deal
with their troubled loans and assets. And a new business was born-workouts.
CURRENT STATE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT INDUSTRY:
The banking industry--starting with the savings and loans--was the first to
experience widespread real estate lending and investment related troubles with pension
funds and insurance companies not far behind. While it seems common knowledge that
the scale of the problems is enormous, quantifying the potential liability for institutional
real estate investors is difficult. This section of the thesis presents current data on the
banking, insurance and pension sectors to piece together a current assessment of the size
and scope of the institutional real estate community's problems. Where possible, specific
data relating to the Travelers Insurance Company and Equitable Life Assurance Society
of the U.S. is used to represent industry trends. (These two companies will be examined
in greater detail in later portions of this thesis.)
The numbers typically used to report on current industry conditions are
staggering, usually in the millions, billions and trillions of dollars. For instance, a 1992
article in The Wall Street Journal pointed out a sizable discrepancy in the estimated total
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cost of the thrift industry bailout by the Resolution Trust Corporation.5 Albert Casey, the
CEO of the RTC, said in May, 1992 that the cost of rescuing the savings and loans
probably will not exceed an estimated $130 billion.6 The Wall Street Journal, however,
pointed out that a more complete analysis has been done by banking consultant Alex
Sheshunoff of Austin, Texas.7 His analysis not only included costs since 1985 (the RTC
only included bailout costs from 1988 on), but added the interest expenses on the bailout
funding, as well as costs relating to higher deposit insurance premiums. Sheshunoff
estimated that the total taxpayer expense will amount to $2.34 trillion by the year 2019.8
(In constant 1990 dollars, assuming 4.5% inflation, that amounts to $1.12 trillion.) This
is one of the first published estimates that may provide a more realistic picture of the total
costs--many hidden in the political bureaucracy--of the thrift industry bailout.
Similar signs of mounting distress come from the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) which said its reserves for losses at banks that are expected to fail
had been doubled for the 1991 fiscal year to $15.4 billion. 9 This loss reserve, however, is
merely a reflection of federal funding allotments as voted by Congress. A more realistic
assessment provided by the FDIC's 1991 year-end annual financial disclosures was given
in the following report:
Although the number of problem banks rose only slightly to 1,090
in 1991 from 1,046 in 1990, total assets at these banks soared to $609.8
billion from $408.7 billion. Assets from failed banks held for liquidation
nearly doubled to $34.4 billion from $18 billion.
Although the FDIC handled fewer bank failures in 1991, the
average asset size was more than five times the average in 1990. The
FDIC said 168 banks failed in 1990, with average total assets of $14.7
5 Carlton, Jim, "Interest Swells Cost of Thrift Bailout," The Wall Street Journal, June 10, 1992, p.
Bl.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 "FDIC Funds Allotted for Problem Banks Doubled Last Year," The Wall Street Journal, June 3,
1992, p. A8.
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billion. In 1991 the FDIC seized 124 failed banks, with record average
assets of $63.1 billion.10
Each successive year brings reports of new records in total insolvencies, losses, and
needed reserves.
The total cleanup costs for the banking industry continue to climb day by day as
political inexpediency and a depressed U.S. economy delay efforts to quickly resolve the
problems. One can only extrapolate from piecemeal information found imbedded in
related industry reports to estimate the potential total costs of these delays. A recent
article reported, for instance, that 40 insolvent savings and loans are due for government
seizure but can't be sold or liquidated until congress passes another funding bill for the
thrift industry bailout. 11 "In the meantime, they continue to accumulate losses of $1
million to $2.5 million a day that eventually will be borne by taxpayers." 12 Time,
therefore, is a precious commodity as even relatively short delays can add millions of
dollars to losses and eventual cleanup costs. Taken in the aggregate, these delays only
inflate the nearly incomprehensible proportions of the losses eventually to be borne by
taxpayers.
The problems and costly delays, however, are not merely isolated to the banking
industry. Pension funds and insurance companies are left, without any government
safety-net or taxpayer financed rescue effort, to deal with their own real estate related
troubles.
A group of 24 life insurance companies was surveyed by the Mortgage Bankers
Association to assess the value of their loans currently tied up in bankruptcy court
proceedings (a strategy often employed by borrowers to buy more time with a lender).
This group of commercial real estate lenders reported that the value of their loans tied up
10 Ibid.
11 Thomas, Paulette, "Thrift Industry Had Record Profit In the First Quarter," The Wall Street
Journal, June 17, 1992, p. A6.
12 Ibid.
Page 10
Chapter One
in bankruptcy doubled in 1991 from the previous year to $1.17 billion. 13 As the U.S.
legal system gets clogged with an unprecedented number of bankruptcy filings, the
delays--and costs--mount. These 24 companies, which hold only about $80 billion in
commercial real estate mortgages, provide just a glimpse into the scope of the problems
affecting the insurance industry. Yet this group said that bankruptcy-law filings made in
1991 alone accounted for $993.6 million of the loans tied up under Chapter 11 filings,
more than double the $452.5 million in loans that were part of new bankruptcy cases in
1990.14 As these trends indicate, borrowers may be getting either more savvy or more
desperate. Delays mean additional losses and higher costs. Lenders have begun to
recognize the value of more expedient and cooperative ways to approach trouble assets
and loan defaults. These lenders are also lobbying Congress to alter the existing U.S.
Bankruptcy Code to reduce the number of single asset borrower defaults that can be
protected under Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings in a move to stem the costly delay tactic
from being employed as often. 15
The effects of the real estate lending and investment related problems are often
reported in the aggregate, as indicators of industry performance or general economic
trends. The impact on individual institutional investors, however, has also been
enormous. The Travelers Insurance Company, whose real estate related problems run
deep, serves as an example of what is going on in the industry. Travelers, for instance,
halved its 1991 net income to $318 million because of losses on real estate. 16 As a
diversified investment company, Travelers' problems can spread to other asset classes
and industries. Individual insurance policyholders may even be affected as Travelers'
liquidity, investment ratings and solvency are called into question. With an estimated
13 Harlan, Christi, "Lenders Push To Alter Laws on Bankruptcy," The Wall Street Journal, June
9, 1992, p. A4.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Pulliam, Susan, "Travelers Unit's Financial-Strength Rating Is Reduced," The Wall Street
Journal, June 5, 1992, p. B5.
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$15 billion invested in real estate, Travelers currently has about 36% of its portfolio
classified as underperforming.17 Citing the company's real estate troubles, Moody's
Investor Service Inc. and Standard & Poors Corp. both recently downgraded Travelers'
financial strength rating to Baa-1 from A-2 (a two notch drop). Travelers' rating is now
lower than all but a handful of the nation's largest life insurance companies tracked by
the investment ratings services. 18 The effect is to force Travelers to pay higher interest
rates on money that it borrows (sometimes in the form of GICs or other corporate
securities) to stay liquid. "Based on our understanding of their current capital raising
efforts and based on their real-estate portfolio, we felt the downgrading was necessary,"
said Chester Murray, associate director with Moody's. 19 Industry sources now believe,
however, that Travelers might be facing a liquidity squeeze, largely because of efforts to
support its problem real estate and its lowered credit rating.20 According to an
investment banking firm analyst, even prior to its credit rating being lowered to Baa-1 by
Moody's and Standard & Poors, Travelers had to offer substantial interest premiums in
order to place $300 million in 10-year senior notes during the first quarter of 1992. These
notes were sold to yield 9.5%, more than 200 basis points over the 10-year Treasury
note.2 1 "Travelers was hoping to sell these notes priced at only 175 basis points over, but
had to extend that in order to get them sold," the analyst said. "That means that they
were very anxious to place them at practically any cost in order to get the funding." 22
"If you paid $50 million for some real estate five years ago
expecting to pay it off ..and now GICs are not being reinvested and your
mortgage loan is not paying off through foreclosure or default.. .you have
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.20 Williams, Fred, "Travelers In Trouble-But So Are Others," Pensions & Investments, March
16, 1992, p.1.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
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a liquidity crunch. In a normal market [Travelers] would just go out and
issue more GICs to receive funding, but now no one is buying them." 23
Despite the spate of recent bad news, Travelers may have a lead within the insurance
industry in confronting its real estate related troubles; it recognized and admitted to its
problems relatively early. Many other insurance companies may be in similar, albeit less
conspicuous, situations.
If guaranteed investment contract business is any indicator of an insurance
company's real estate related troubles, it is telling that both Equitable Life and Aetna Life
lost more GIC business in 1991 than Travelers. Equitable lost $3.135 billion in GIC
business while Aetna lost $1.454 billion, compared to Travelers 1991 loss of $1.361
billion.24
All three had been among the industry's leaders in new GIC
business. Now they have mounting financial woes linked to the same
problems that prompted [pension] plan sponsors to flee from GICs:
deteriorating credit quality caused largely by underperforming mortgage
loans and problem real estate.25
Recent reports such as these are an ominous fact of life for both the insurance industry
and institutional investment community as a whole. Pension funds, for instance,
frequently rely on individual insurance companies to manage their real estate loans and
equity investments. The real estate troubles reported in the insurance industry have a
direct link and impact on the pensions. It becomes more understandable, therefore, why
four times as many pension executives, when recently polled, said they planned to
terminate their current real estate investment manager. 26 (35 pension plans said they
23 Ibid., Quote attributed to "another financial analyst."
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Hemmerick, Steve, "Real estate may drop 15% more," Pensions & Investments, April 27, 1992,
p.35.
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dropped a real estate investment adviser in 1991, but 120 pension plans said they
anticipated dropping a real estate investment manager in 1992.)27
Pension funds obviously have their own industry-wide real estate troubles to
contend with. SEI Capital Resources, 28 a firm that tracks a group of 65 real estate funds,
reported a record low one-year performance of -8.6% median total return for 1991.29
(The previous record low of +2.2% was set in 1990.) SEI Capital Resources also
reported that trophy class real estate assets--the properties the pension funds expected to
help mitigate the effects of overall falling real estate investment performance--
experienced the largest drop, down 8.3% in returns.30
All property types have been experiencing a substantial loss in value in the past
few years leaving virtually all pension funds with problem assets, despite the focus or
diversification of real estate held in a particular fund's portfolios. Consider the following
three reports, each representing a different type of portfolio property investment: 31
. JMB Institutional Realty Corp., Chicago, reported its Group Trust IV
fund had 4.6% in income but a 25.2% depreciation in value for a total
return of -20.6% for the year ended Dec. 31, 1991. The fund invests
primarily in retail malls and first-class offices.
- CIGNA Investments Inc.'s Separate Account R reported income of 6.7%
but depreciation of 16.1% for a total return of -9.4% for the year ended
Dec. 31, 1991. The fund has a mix of commercial property investments.
. The LaSalle Street Fund of LaSalle Advisors Ltd., Chicago, reported an
income return of 5.86% but depreciation of 18.25% for a total return of
-12.39% for the year. The fund invests primarily in premier office
properties.
27 Ibid.
28 SEI Capital Resources, Wayne, PA.
29 Hemmerick, Steve, "'91 Real Estate Returns Plunge to Record Lows," Pensions & Investments,
February 17, 1992, p.1.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., emphasis added.
Page 14
Chapter One
On the whole, pension fund real estate portfolios lost 10% to 15% of their value,
excluding income, in 1991 alone. According to Thomas Mahoney, a managing director
at CIGNA Investments, 1991 represented "pretty much a freefall" in real estate
performance. He said real estate managers hope the market is bottoming out, but added
"there is no way to really know." 32 While the numbers are still coming in, recent reports
indicate that 1992 may be the worst year yet for pension funds since they began investing
in real estate. The 1992 year-end Russell-NCREIF Property Index could hit -4.5%,
according to predictions by the real estate research department of Salomon Brothers Inc.,
New York. This would be 550 basis points below the previous Russell-NCREIF Property
Index record low of 1.2% for calendar 1990.33 Pension fund real estate portfolios may
lose an additional 15% to 20% in value in 1992, according to current industry predictions,
amounting to another $15 billion to $20 billion loss for the pension funds. 34
Even with these writedowns by pension funds, many portfolios are still
overvalued. A Salomon Brothers survey recently revealed that real estate money
managers said they would not pay the high prices they have placed on the overall value of
their own portfolios. The survey showed a 330 basis point spread between the bid and
ask price for real estate.35 (A 50 to 70 point spread is considered normal.)
. SUMMARY:
Overvaluation, lagging performance and dismal returns are the symptoms of an
ailing real estate industry. Pension funds, insurance companies and other institutional
investors will be dealing with their troubled loans and investments for years to come. A
government bailout--particularly one on the scale of the effort and expense being used to
rescue the savings and loan industry--is improbable. Institutional investors will have to
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Hemmerick, Steve, Pensions & Investments, "Real estate may drop 15% more," April 27, 1992,
p.1.
35 Ibid.
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use their own financial and human resources to meet the challenges now before them. If
the challenge of the 80's was how to make the most real estate loans and investments, the
challenge of the 90's is how to most effectively deal with troubled assets. Institutional
investors are making strategic and structural changes to adapt to the instability in the
external markets.
This thesis will examine whether institutional investors, particularly insurance
companies, are using organizational restructuring as an effective intervention strategy to
acquire new skills or redeploy resources. To what extent are market forces requiring
institutional investors to become better learners? Are institutional investors spending
more of their time, money and human resources on working out their real estate problems
rather than focusing on making new loans or equity investments? Have they reorganized
their corporate task systems around those functional skills that are now needed most? Is
there an increased need for organizational collaboration, cooperation, learning and
change? These are some of the questions that this thesis will address.
THESIS OUTLINE:
This thesis will explore how institutional real estate investors can adapt to the
changes that are occurring in a highly dynamic real estate market. It will identify the
types of structural and strategic changes that institutional investors are making within
their own organizations and will highlight areas of concern for those organizations
actively considering ways to make more effective use of their resources.
"Organizational learning" is a body of management-related literature that deals
with how organizations learn in order to have the ability to continuously adapt to change.
A discussion of key "organizational learning" concepts is presented in Chapter Two.
Adaptation and change comes to institutional investors in the form of organizational
restructuring. Outlines of organizational structure and organizational obstacles to change
round out the academic framework presented in the second chapter. Chapter Three
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presents data collected from two institutional real estate investors from the insurance
industry--Equitable Real Estate Management Inc. and the Travelers Realty Investment
Company--that are actively involved in managing large portfolios of loans and assets, but
are experiencing different amounts of real estate related troubles. The final chapter of
this thesis includes a comparative analysis of the two firms and presents general
conclusions to guide those institutional real estate investors concerned with using there
organizational resources more effectively,
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CHAPTER TWO
- ACADEMIC FRAMEWORK:
As described in the first chapter, the magnitude of the real estate trouble is
astounding with costs and losses routinely counted in the billions and trillions of dollars.
The stakes, therefore, are enormous as organizations work to cope with difficult markets
and portfolios of troubled loans and assets. With increasing commercial vacancy rates,
falling property values across virtually all product types, and severe capital illiquidity, the
real estate industry is challenged by what one might euphemistically call extraordinary
change. These changes have been swift, numerous and frequent enough to create
fundamental shifts in the industry, shifts that will be with us even after we settle into a
more promising part of an economic cycle.
Institutional real estate investors are now faced with the challenge of coping with
this extraordinary change. Firms must learn to adapt as external market forces mandate
internal organizational change. The acquisition of new skills or a redeployment of existing
resources may help these companies adapt, survive and even prosper. But what kinds of
changes are needed and what criteria should serve as a guide? The academic foundation for
this inquiry is presented in this chapter.
- ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING:
"Organizational learning" is a body of management literature that directly addresses
issues relating to how organizations develop competency to handle change. Individual and
organizational learning, therefore, serves as a foundation on which to build an inquiry into
organizational change. Organizations must be able to deal with change at one of three
competence levels. At a bare minimum, firms need the ability to change to survive during
periods of extreme externally imposed pressures. 1 Research concludes that most
companies chose to maintain a sense of "internal consistency" within the structure of their
1 Argyris, Chris and Donald Schon, Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective,
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1978, p. 18, 29.
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operations rather than make the effort to continuously adapt to their environment over
time.2 This means that these companies:
...maintain internal consistency at the expense of gradually worsening fit
with [their] environment, at least until the fit becomes so bad that [they]
must undergo sudden structural redesign to achieve a newly internally
consistent configuration. In other words, the choice is between evolution
and revolution, between perpetual mild adaptation, which favors external fit
over time, and infrequent major realignment, whichfavors consistency over
time.3
This kind of crisis management in response to extreme organizational stress usually means
that change occurs sporadically, in quantum leaps. These firms value internal consistency,
particularly when markets become highly unstable and unpredictable; they will put up with
brief periods of severe disruption to realign fit occasionally. This is a learning process that
Daniel Miller calls the "quantum" theory of structural change.4
Firms, however, that exhibit greater competence in managing change are ones that
attain a higher level of organizational learning; this allows companies to effectively manage
change on a more continuous basis. These firms opt more for evolution and continuous
adaptation. They strive to keep up with unpredictable or unstable environments and are
willing to live with more internally perceived risk and inconsistency. 5
But why should a firm choose to continue to build its competence level beyond that
necessitated by changes occurring in the external environment? Why do some firms seek
more than internal consistency and stability in their way of doing things? Argyris and
Schtn have said that the learning process itself, once started, can make us aware of a new
reality that demands this type of continuous, evolutionary response:
2 Miller, Daniel, Revolution and Evolution: A Quantum View of Organizational Adaptation,
working paper, McGill University, 1960.
3 Mintzberg, Henry, "Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?," Harvard Business Review, January-
February, 1981, p. 115.
4 Op. Cit., Daniel Miller.
5 Op. Cit., Henry Mintzberg.
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...We begin to suspect that there is no stable state awaiting us over
the horizon. On the contrary, our very power to solve problems seems to
multiply problems. As a result, our organizations live in economic,
political, and technological environments which are predictably unstable.
The requirement for organizational earning is not an occasional, sporadic
phenomenon, but is continuous and endemic to our society.6
Given this perspective, it becomes understandable why some organizations strive for more,
why once started, some firms come to value evolution and learning as a way of life and will
structure themselves accordingly to reap the benefits of their learning ability.
At the highest competence level, therefore, are those organizations that actively seek
and promote continuous change. These organizations highly value the process of change
and have structured themselves to facilitate learning, collaboration and innovation. These
firms, known as "learning organizations," serve as the paradigm for organizational
learning. 7 They view change and learning as inextricable elements of the business
environment. Learning organizations often give higher value and priority to such concepts
as "creativity," "innovation," and "the management of change."8 They deliberately develop
their learning ability as a strategic advantage, often to pursue emerging opportunities or
acquire greater competency to outperform their competition. Learning organizations,
therefore, exhibit the highest level of competence in dealing with change and are able to
exploit this ability to their competitive advantage.
6 Op. Cit., Argyris and Schon, p. 9.
7 Ibid., p. 26
8 Ibid.
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- WHAT IS AN ORGANIZATION?
While we often speak of organizations as if they were sentient entities capable of
making choices, gathering experience, and learning, these are activities carried out by
individuals within the organization itself. Individuals within the organization function as an
organic network that, in their collectivity, serve as agents for organizational action,
particularly organizational learning:9
It is true that we do apply to organizations many of the terms we
also apply to individuals. We speak of organizational action and
organizational behavior. We speak also of organizational intelligence and
memory. We say that organizations learn, or fail to learn. Nevertheless, a
closer examination of these ways of speaking suggests that such terms are
metaphors. Organizations do not literally remember, think, or learn.10
Using a cognitive metaphor, individuals interact and communicate by making synaptic
connections that allow an organization, operating as a networked collectivity, to carry out
its functions. Individual learning allows for new connections to be made which, in turn,
allows for greater cognitive abilities at the organizational level. Individuals, therefore,
serve as agents for organizational action and learning. Yet, there is a difference between a
group of individuals and an organization. Left to their own devices individuals may work
together, but may not be an "organization":
... The mob is a collectivity. It is a collection of people who may run,
shout, and mill about together. But it is a collectivity which cannot make a
decision or take an action in its own name, and its boundaries are vague and
diffuse.11
The very word "organization" holds the key to how a group becomes more than merely a
collection of individuals. In an organization, there is an order to what otherwise might be
anarchy and chaos. This order comes in the form of three conditions that are sufficient to
make a "mob" of individuals into an organization:
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1.) An organization must be able to make decisions in the name
of the collectivity;
2.) It must be able to delegate to individuals the authority to act
for the collectivity; and
3.) It must have the capability of establishing boundaries
between itself and the rest of the world.12
Each of these three criteria is contingent upon the overlay of order and structure on
the collection of individuals so that they may act and identify themselves as an organization.
As Argyris and Sch6n have said, "A collection of individuals organizes when its members
develop rules for collective decision, delegation and membership. In their rule-governed
behavior, they act for the collectivity in ways that reflect a task system."13 The imposition
of order comes in the form of rules, explicit or tacit, that guide the individual members'
actions. These rules are imposed through organizational structure, such as a division of
labor, to form an organization's cognitive network. An inquiry into organizational
behavior and cognitive processes (such as learning) is dependent, then, on understanding
how an organization is ordered-that is, how the organization has structured itself to allow
for such structural elements as its division of labor.
The semantics can become convoluted, but how an organization is organized--that
is, how it is structured and managed to allow for individuals to network and interact--
influences group behavior and collective processes. Individual action and organizational
structure, therefore, have a great influence on the firm's ability to act, learn and change. If
an organization is made up of a collection of individuals, however, who act as agents for
the functions attributed to the organization, how is an organization--as an entity itself--to be
defined? Where is the line drawn between individual action and organizational action?
Argyris and Sch6n have defined an organization in one of two ways. An organization may
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be defined in how it is said to act or, alternatively, how it is said to know something or to
learn. 14 A collectivity can be defined as an organization when it is said to act as: 15
. a government or "polis";
. an agency; or
- a task system.
Alternatively, an organization may be said to know something--or to learn--when defined
as:16
. a theory of action;
. a cognitive enterprise undertaken by individual members; or
- a cognitive artifact made up of individual images and public maps.
In each of these definitions, the concept of agency and the individual--or more
appropriately, a collection of individuals--is still central to the notion of organizational
being and action. When the mob has met the three sufficient conditions to organize itself, it
takes on a collective identity and becomes a political entity (in the ancient Greek sense, a
"polis"):17
...Before an organization can be anything else, it must be in this sense
political, because it is as a political entity that the collectivity can take
organizational action. It is individuals who decide and act, but they do these
things for the collectivity by virtue of the rules for decision, delegation and
membership. When the members of the collectivity have created such rules,
they have organized.18
The organization, though made up of individual members who act as agents for
organizational action, takes on a life of its own.
Even though it has its own identity and has in this sense become a political entity,
the organization is still dependent on the networking of individuals for its existence.
Individual perceptions and behavior, therefore, are central to the physical attributes and
cognitive abilities exhibited by organizations. An inquiry into an organization's cognitive
14 Ibid., p. 12.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
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abilities--its ability to learn and change--must consider some of the organizational building
blocks known as individual "images" and public "maps."
. IMAGES AND MAPS:
As a political entity, the collectivity is able to interact to bind individual perceptions
and values into a shared identity and sense of organizational "self." How members build
this common organizational identity is dependent, however, on their individual "images"
and their shared vision of organizational "maps." An "image" is defined as an individual's
perception and description of an organization in relation to his or her interaction with the
rest of the organization. 19 This individual image is dependent, therefore, upon how the
member perceives the organizational world and his or her position in it; it is dependent on
the individual's unique set of circumstances in relation to the rest of the collectivity. This
definition recognizes the organic and dynamic ordering among individuals that is the basis
for organization within the collectivity:
An organization is like an organism each of whose cells contains a
particular, partial, changing image of itself in relation to the whole. And
like such an organism, the organization's practice stems from those very
images. Organization is an artifact of individual ways of representing
organization.20
Individual images are combined and ordered to create a networking of identities and
cognitive processes to form the organizational entity. How these individual "images" are
networked creates the shared perception of order and structure that guides the organization
in its collective action and behavior. This shared perception, therefore, serves as a
normative internal reference for the organization, or what is known as the organization's
"theory-in-use": 2 1
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..Jt is in this continual, concerted meshing of individual images of self and
others, of one's own activity in the context of collective interaction, which
constitutes an organization's knowledge of its theory-in-use.22
As the collectivity becomes an organization, the kind of an organization it becomes
is dependent on how the order is imposed to form a task system-that is, how the
organizational structure is applied so that the individual pieces are networked in such a
manner as to allow organizational identity, delegation and decision making to take place.
Consequently, there is a coalescing of individual components into something that has the
potential to be greater than the sum of its parts. While an organizational structure may be
imposed on the collectivity, the naturally occurring (and evolving) synaptic linkage forms
an organization's theory-in-use-its normative way of operating despite the intended
organizational design.
An organizational "map" is a public representation of an organization's theory-in-
use.23 These public maps provide a more stable reference for individuals within the
organization to help them identify the actual division of labor and guide their behavior.
Maps can also serve as public references to help define an organization's structure and
cognitive networking:
These [maps] are the shared descriptions of organization which individuals
jointly construct and use to guide their own inquiry. They include, for
example, diagrams of work flow, compensation charts, statements of
procedure, even the schematic drawings of office space. ... They describe
actual patterns of activity, and they are guides to future action.24
These shared maps, then, serve the dual function of internally guiding the complex network
of individual interactions and providing an explicit external reference to help those outside
of the organization better understand and define the collectivity.25
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 17.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
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While the organization's normative theory-in-use guides individuals in their
organizational actions, it is important to note that relationships and shared perceptions are
fluid and are continually being updated. It is common for there to be inconsistencies
between the external references provided by an organization's "theory-of-action" (or
"espoused theory") and its actual internal workings as represented by its "theory-in-use." 26
While an organization may create an external identity that appears stable, logical and
explicit, it is by its very nature a more dynamic and organic collection of individuals and
their images. An organization, as such, is always in the process of redefining itself;
consequently, its espoused "theory-of-action" often differs from its "theory-in-use."
While an organization's espoused theory may be explicit, its theory-in-use may
often have components that are more informal and tacit.27 It is important to note, therefore,
that an assessment of an organization's theory-in-use should "...be inferred from
observation of organizational behavior-that is, from organizational decisions and
actions." 28 Otherwise, there may be an unexplainable dichotomy in what an organization
says and what it does. In addition, even though images and maps can provide reference
points, individuals are continuously in the process of redefining their relationships relative
to the rest of the organization. In this sense, individuals within the organization are always
coming to know themselves, their roles, and their organizations better. An inquiry into
organizational action and learning is concerned more with a process than a given state of
being, or as Argyris and Sch6n stated:
...our inquiry into organizational learning must concern itself not with static
entities called organizations, but with an active process of organizing which
is, at root, a cognitive enterprise. Individual members are continually
engaged in attempting to know the organization, and to know themselves in
the context of the organization. At the same time, their continuing efforts to
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know and to test their knowledge represent the object of their inquiry.
Organizing is reflexive inquiry.29
An examination of collective perceptions and actions, therefore, yields information about
organizational processes, not stable states.
Organizational learning is dependent on this individual learning. Individual
learning, however, must be transferred to the organizational level, or as Argyris and Sch6n
have affirmed, "...there is no organizational learning without individual learning, and that
individual learning is a necessary but insufficient condition for organizational learning." 30
Consequently, how individual inquiry is transformed into organizational learning defines a
firm's competence at handling change.
But how does learning take place? The learning process, both at the individual and
organizational levels, is the subject of the next section of this thesis.
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. THE LEARNING PROCESS:
Having defined an organization, the question then becomes how does an
organization learn? To understand how organizations learn, it is first necessary to
understand how individuals learn.
Individual learning is a process that, in its simplest form, has been described by
David Kolb who refers to Kurt Lewin's four-stage experientially based cycle of learning. 31
Graphically, Lewin's model is represented by the following diagram:
Concrete
Experience
(Active Observation an~d
FExperimentation reflections
Formation of abstract
concepts and generalizations
THE LEWIN EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING CYCLE
This cycle begins as an individual collects concrete experience in a particular
situation. The individual is then able to reflect on this experience as a means of
conceptualizing new ways of thinking about a situation. Through "abstract thinking" the
individual is able to formulate innovative approaches to a problem or inquiry. The new
approach can then be tested through active experimentation which, consequently, gives the
individual new concrete experience to reflect upon. The cycle can be repeated to respond to
continuously changing environments or to facilitate continuous experimentation,
31 Kolb, David, Experiential Learning, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1984, p. 21.
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innovation, and learning.32 Kolb describes learning using this model as a continuous
process based on experience, information gathering, cognitive processing and
experimentation. In this sense, he says, "ideas are not fixed and immutable elements of
thought but are formed and re-formed through experience." 33
One of the most noteworthy aspects of this cyclical model of learning is that action
is based on a process of gathering and processing feedback. Individual and collective
behavior (such as information sharing, formal or informal venues for discussion, and
collaboration) are central to organizational action and learning. Individual and
organizational effectiveness can be traced ultimately to an organization's information
sharing capability and its competence in facilitating communication among individual
members. 34 The lack of adequate feedback processes within the learning cycle, for
instance, can lead to an imbalance between observation and action, "...either from a
tendency for individuals and organizations to emphasize decision and action at the expense
of information gathering, or from a tendency to become bogged down by the data collection
and analysis." 35
Learning disabilities can also develop when the cycle is interrupted by individual
resistance to participate or facilitate in the feedback, processing, or experimentation stages.
In an earlier work, Argyris and Schbn hypothesized that individual and collective
perceptions ("images" and "maps") influenced organizational effectiveness:
We thought the trouble people have in learning new theories may
stem not so much from the inherent difficulty of the new theories as from
the existing theories people have that already determine practices. We call
their operational theories of action theories-in-use to distinguish them from
espoused theories that are used to describe and justify behavior. We
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., p. 26.
34 Ibid., p. 22.
35 Ibid., attributed to Kurt Lewin and his followers.
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wondered whether the difficulty in learning new theories of action related to
a disposition to protect the old theory-in-use.36
Organizational norms for behavior--whether explicit or tacit--often have a direct bearing on
an organization's ability to generate feedback and foster a learning environment.
Organizational learning is, therefore, highly dependent on individual and collective attitudes
and action as these directly impact feedback, collaboration, and information sharing.
In summary then, individual learning begins with an introspective assessment of
one's personal experience. Individually, we move from the experiential mode into a
reflective mode and we get our feedback either from introspective thought or from feedback
from others. New ideas and abstractions may be sparked by this introspection and
feedback and can lead to individual experimentation to acquire new experience.
The Lewin model also serves to give us insight into how organizations learn.
Organizations go through a similar cycle, but the collective experience is also taken into
account and reflected upon collaboratively, as well as individually. This is a process I call
"intraspective" because it is dependent on individuals looking outside of their own sphere,
but conceptually staying within the defined bounds of the organization. As in individual
learning, this intraspective process is dependent on collaborative communication to foster
meaningful and diverse reflective feedback. It is an organic and symbiotic process that can
be fostered, but not forced; individual and collective learning can be facilitated by
establishing conducive environments, but not simply mandated.
Organizations, therefore, need to be cognizant of their structured environments and
informal networks. Proper organizational structure and design facilitates the organizational
learning process. Those organizations that are structured to allow--and actively promote--
high levels of multi-disciplinary interaction and communication will realize higher levels of
"organizational intelligence" and learning. These organizations may, in turn, attain higher
36Argyris, Chris, and Donald Schun, Theory in Practice: Increasing Professional Effectiveness,
Jossey-Bass, 1974, p. viii.
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competence levels in dealing with change and may, therefore, be closer to the paradigm of
the learning organization.
SINGLE-LOOP LEARNING:
Argyris and Sch6n have described organizational learning in terms of single-loops,
double-loops, and deutero-learning, as opposed to the more simplified Lewin cycle.
Single-loop learning is a process concerned primarily with error detection and correction.
The organization's normative behavior and identity are not questioned; its current theory-in-
use is applied to assess whether an intended outcome is likely to be reached. In single-loop
learning:
...members of the organization respond to changes in the internal and
external environments of the organization by detecting errors which they
then correct so as to maintain the central features of organizational theory-in-
use. These are learning episodes which function to preserve a kind of
constancy.37
This can be thought of as a lower-order of learning since the normative organizational
values, which may be contributing to a problem, are not being questioned:
Organizations are pretty good at single-loop learning. Budgets are
set, based largely on past experience, and when the numbers start to come
off-budget, the department, division, or company adjusts. It's like the
thermostat-if the room is too cold, the furnace kicks in. If the numbers are
below budget, cut costs, sell harder, or raise prices. That's just straight
feedback-single-loop adjustment, and there is nothing wrong with it
unless the environment changes.38
Organizations that engage primarily in this single-loop learning tend to evaluate success
based on their effectiveness in accomplishing an intended outcome.39 Single loop learning
is, therefore, primarily concerned with effectiveness, "...that is, how best to achieve
37 Argyris, Chris and Donald Schon, Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective,
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1978, p. 18.
38 Waterman, Robert H., Jr., The Renewal Factor, 1987, Bantam Books, p. 149.
39 Op. Cit., Argyris, Chris and Donald Schdn, p. 29.
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existing goals and objectives and how best to keep organizational performance within the
range of specified existing norms." 40
Single-loop learning, while it may be collective learning, may not be organizational
learning. Single-loop learning, since it involves mostly error detection and correction, may
involve groups of individuals working together, but it may not lead to organizational
adaptation within dynamic environments; nor may it give organizations the ability to
anticipate changes or foster innovation. An organization must be willing to question its
most fundamental elements, such as those embedded in its current theory-in-use. An
examination of the cognitive network and process is as important as an assessment of an
intended outcome. The organizational inquiry needs to call into question the very character
of the organization itself; is there something in the structure or value system that needs to
change or adapt to the environment? For organizational learning to take place, an
organization's theory-in-use, as defined by its individuals' images and its organizational
maps, must be open to alteration:41
... in orderfor organizational learning to occur, learning agents' discoveries,
inventions, and evaluations must be embedded in organizational memory.
They must be encoded in the individual images and the shared maps of
organizational theory-in-use from which individual members will
subsequently act. If this encoding does not occur, individuals will have
learned but the organization will not have done so.42
Organizations that may be highly competent in detecting errors and making changes to
increase their overall success rate and effectiveness may not be engaging in a learning
process that will allow them to adapt to changing environments.
A more holistic approach to organizational learning in which organizational norms
themselves are open to modification, a process know as "double-loop learning," describes
a "reflexive" inquiry process that leads to organizational learning and change.
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* DOUBLE-LOOP LEARNING:
Organizations that exist and compete in highly dynamic environments may benefit
by continually examining their existing theories-in-use and by making evolutionary changes
at both the individual and organizational level. This requires a more complex and
sophisticated learning process called "double-loop learning."
Double-loop learning involves a process that calls into question the most
fundamental individual and organizational values, perceptions, and theories of action.
According to Argyris and Sch6n, managers and workers must understand that they cannot
achieve substantive change or evolution merely by "learning" to do better what they already
know how to do (i.e., merely engage in outcome-oriented single-loop learning). 43 To
effectively bring about more continuous organizational change (evolution, as opposed to
revolution), corporate managers and workers can participate in a collaborative inquiry
process that questions the very structure and strategies of the organization itself.44 For
instance, rather than simply add more staff or upgrade technology to meet increased work
demands, a firm might ask is there a better way to go about doing the work in the first
place? Who is involved, how are they working together, and is there another, better
approach?
Continuous organizational change is not an easy or painless process; constant
change presents a conflict for workers and managers in that it upsets the corporate norm for
stability and predictability in the management of organizational affairs.45 The conflict
arises when managers realize that there is a need for organizational change that can only be
accomplished by changing the organization's normative standards and theory-in-use-its
strategies and structures:
Hence, the corporate managers find themselves confronted with
conflicting requirements. If they conform to the imperative for [change],
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they must give up on the imperative for predictability. .. A process of
change initiated with an eye to effectiveness under existing norms turns out
to yield a conflict in the norms themselves.46
Double-loop learning is, by definition, a form of organizational inquiry which resolves
incompatible corporate organizational norms by setting new priorities and weightings of
norms, or by restructuring the norms themselves together with associated strategies and
assumptions. 47
Those organizations that are committed to realizing greater competence in dealing
with dynamic environments and the associated organizational change it may necessitate will
make the effort to engage in this double-loop learning type of inquiry. But as enlightened
as these organizations may be, there is yet a higher level of learning and a greater degree of
competence to be reached in dealing with organizational change.
. DEUTERO-LEARNING:
Organizations that are engaged in continuous, reflexive inquiry to bring about
evolutionary change can benefit by learning how to most effectively learn. Metaphorically,
organizations are no different than children who, upon entering the first grade, need to
learn how to learn; good learning skills and a conducive learning environment can lead to
greater achievement.
Organizationally, continuous learning--or learning to learn--is what Gregory
Bateson has called second-order learning, or "deutero-learning." 48 Organizations that
routinely engage in deutero-learning usually give higher value and priority to creating an
environment that fosters creativity and innovation.49 Deutero-learning also allows an
organization to more effectively control and manage change. 50 In essence, the organization
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., p. 24.
48 Op. Cit., Argyris and Sch6n, 1978, p. 26., referring to Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology
of Mind, Ballantine Books, New York, 1971.
49 Op. Cit., Argyris and Sch6n, 1978, p. 26.
50 Ibid.
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goes through the four stages of the Lewin cycle of learning with regard to the learning
process itself:
When an organization engages in deutero-learning, its members
learn, too, about previous contexts for learning. They reflect on and inquire
into previous episodes of organizational earning, or failure to learn. They
discover what they did that facilitated or inhibited learning, they invent new
strategies for learning, they produce these strategies, and they evaluate and
generalize what they have produced. The results become encoded in the
individual images and maps and are reflected in organizational learning
practice.51
Learning to learn is the behavior and the domain of the learning organization.
Turning an eye inward on the organization, valuing "intraspection" in its normative theory-
in-use, allows a learning organization to achieve greater competence in dealing with
change. The companies that make this extra-dimensional learning effort have better
organizational skills and, therefore, have a greater ability to anticipate and exploit dynamic
markets. These organizations may even gain a strategically competitive advantage and may
learn to welcome and thrive on change.
Individuals, as agents for organizational action, can increase the collective cognitive
ability of the organization by engaging in this higher-order learning activity. Deutero-
learning can catalyze the double-loop learning process. Structuring an organization so that
it may learn and become a better learner is, therefore, integral to the formation of a learning
organization.
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e ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND LEARNING:
Organizational learning ability is dependent on how individuals are able to interact
and how cognitive networks are allowed to form. How an organization is structured,
therefore, influences a firm's ability to engage in double-loop and deutero-learning. Firms
that are structured to allow these higher-order types of learning can use restructuring as an
effective intervention strategy to respond to changes in internal or external environments. 52
An organization that is actively involved in double-loop learning will allow itself to
question its images and maps (its normative theory-in-use), including its structure. A firm
can reflect on its experience with its current structure, engage in collaborative inquiry to
generate potentially better ways of structuring, and actively experiment with structural
modifications to gain new experience. It can then assess these structural changes to see if
there has been an improvement in its organizational effectiveness. As an organization
repeatedly engages in this double-loop learning process, it also learns what to expect during
the four stages of the learning cycle itself. In other words, the organization learns to
become more efficient at implementing change. In this respect, it is simultaneously
engaging in deutero-learning as it learns how to learn, or how to more effectively handle
the process of organizational change itself:
.. An organization may be said to learn when it restructures itself in
response to change in internal or external environment. ...But from the
point of view of intervention, organizational learning has primarily to do
with the ways in which members of the organization learn to select new
structures and modify old ones so as to respond more effectively to changed
conditions, or to create an environment more conducive to individual
learning.53
A firm, therefore, can respond to environmental change by making structural adaptations,
by changing its theory-in-use and restructuring its fundamental physical and cognitive
networking. The goal is to create an organization that is better able to perform its function
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(its mission) and better able to recognize and respond to future environmental shifts (to
engage in double-loop and deutero-learning).
What kinds of organizational structure, however, facilitate this type of
organizational inquiry, learning, and change? Are there organizational designs that include
the appropriate structural elements to foster conducive individual and organizational
learning environments? Is there such a thing as an organizational "structure" that can
withstand, or even foster, continuous evolutionary restructuring as the organization itself
learns and grows?
To answer these questions, it is first necessary to have an understanding of the
basic types of organizational designs and structural elements. The next section of this
thesis will, therefore, outline the five fundamental organizational structures described by
Henry Mintzberg. In addition, the most important organizational structural elements will be
discussed to build a framework that can be used to assess an organization's potential
learning ability.
- FORMS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE:
Henry Mintzberg has outlined five organizational configurations that he asserts can
be used to broadly describe the structure of almost any firm. These are the simple
structure, machine bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy, divisionalized form, and
adhocracy. 54
In the case of the "simple structure," organizational coordination is achieved by
direct supervision of a chief executive who gives orders and manages all of the daily
operations of the firm.55 There is a minimum of operating staff and middle management.
Most institutional real estate investment firms, however, manage portfolios that are too
54 Mintzberg, Henry, "Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?," Harvard Business Review, January-
February, 1981, p. 103.
55 Ibid., p. 105.
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large and need to carry out a variety of functions that are too complex to allow for this type
of direct, autocratic control.
A "machine bureaucracy" configuration occurs when a firm's primary concern is to
standardize its work.56 As the firm focuses on having each of its work functions well-
defined and controlled it builds a large administrative staff, particularly consisting of a
technostructure (a highly skilled middle management) that is able to design and control the
work standards. Since the nature of real estate development and investing does not lend
itself to standardization, particularly during periods characterized by great instability and
change, institutional investors in general have not gravitated towards machine bureaucracy
structures.
When an organization, however, relies on the standardization of its employee's
skills to coordinate its operations, it takes on the form of a "professional bureaucracy." 57 It
will have highly trained professionals in its operating staff and a large support staff to back
them up. The skilled, highly trained professionals need less supervision to perform their
work, so relatively little middle management is needed to carry out this function. The
financial analysis, valuation, property management, accounting and reporting functions, for
example, that are integral to most institutional real estate investment firms' operations can
easily be coordinated through standardization of these essential skills; hiring well-trained,
highly skilled professionals is, therefore, the norm at these firms. Most institutional
investors, consequently, can be expected to have at least some of the attributes of a
professional bureaucracy in their current organizational structures.
The "divisionalized form" of organizational structure is characterized by a firm that
divides itself into parallel operating units, giving a certain amount of autonomy to the
middle line managers of each unit.58 Overall coordination is accomplished by
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standardizing the expected outputs of each unit (i.e., expecting a standard level of
performance). In many respects, the institutional investors examined in this thesis were
structured so that local offices operated as units autonomous to one another, but
coordinated by a "home office" or "corporate office." Real estate is, in many respects, a
local commodity. The divisionalized form, therefore, naturally fits with a national
institutional investor's need to maintain extensive coordination, but retain local market
knowledge and relationships.
Finally, the most flexible and adaptable firms are structured in such a way as to
require sophisticated specialists to combine their efforts in project teams to organizationally
form an "adhocracy." 59 Overall coordination is achieved by mutual adjustment and
consensus; traditional managerial roles and departmental distinctions tend to break down:
In today's turbulent business environment, only organizations that
adapt can survive. Older metaphors described organizations as efficient
machines, an analogy that worked fairly well in more stable business
environments. Each part of the organization served a single purpose.
...Today's environment demands a more organic, flexible model.60
The adhocracy structure is more fluid and decentralized; it relies heavily on the interplay
and networking among individual members to continuously adapt and redefine its current
operating patterns and structure. Its theory-in-use, therefore, is always open to
modification which allows for an environment that is more naturally conducive to double-
loop and deutero-learning.
From even these brief descriptions of organizational structures, it becomes obvious
that an adhocracy can facilitate a firm's ability to learn and continuously adapt to dynamic
markets. As the environment in which a firm must operate becomes increasingly unstable,
unpredictable, or more competitive, organizational intervention in the form of restructuring
becomes an imperative:
59 Ibid., p. 111.
60 Schultheiss, Emily E., Optimizing the Organization: How to Link People and Technology,
1988, Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, MA, p. 5.
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... there must be a process of reorganizing to deal with brutally competitive
but constantly changing market circumstances. The management
consultant, Henry Strage,61 has summarized the changes he has seen.. .in
four words. "'Alfred Sloan is dead." That classic corporate center with static
planning systems; parallel administrative relationships between line and
staff; common levels of authority and responsibility; identical processes
among divisions for reporting, monitoring, and control; all united by a
single, uniform approach to management development, compensation, and
career planning is obsolete.
Instead we find divisions set up in whatever form seems to reflect
strategic need, reporting to a small, flexible, elite corporate center that plays
a variety of roles-coach, sponsor, surgeon, and architect are Strage's four
categories.62
This is the description of an adhocracy which can supplant the traditional organizational
structures to more effectively deal with highly dynamic environments. A firm must first,
however, have the ability to question its very structure before it can contemplate
reorganization as an organizational intervention strategy. This requires double-loop and
deutero-learning capabilities.
Mintzberg describes adhocracy as being the structure that "suits the industries of
our age," 63 meaning that it is flexible enough to accommodate the dynamic change,
unpredictability and risk that characterize current highly competitive and volatile markets.
Adhocracy makes an organization more reliant on its individuals--its human resources--
rather than structural safeguards, such as centralization of control, to meet challenges and
adversity. As Mintzberg asserts, "adhocracy relies on trained and specialized experts to get
the bulk of its work done... [and these] experts must work together to create new things
instead of working apart to perfect established skills."64 In other words, an adhocracy
61 Attributed to Henry M. Strage, McKinsey & Co. of London, remarks made at the "Strategic
Management Conference" Barcelona, Spain, October, 1985
62 Bower, Joseph L., When Markets Quake, 1986, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA,
p. 213.
63 Op. Cit., Henry Mintzberg, p. 111.64 Ibid., p. 112.
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relies on its double-loop and deutero-learning capabilities to bring about collaboration and
innovation.
When all around them markets are crashing and the instinct to survive is
overpowering, managers must be courageous enough to go against convention, to take
proactive steps to increase innovation, communication, and collaboration while their
competitors take predictable defensive measures to bring more stability and certainty to their
organizations. Those firms that centralize decision making and responsibility just when
they should be freeing up and integrating organizational resources are merely trying to
bring some semblance of order to frightening, often chaotic conditions. This crisis
management, short-term approach tends to be rewarded as managers seem to bring about a
sense of stability and control to an organization as market conditions deteriorate. The
danger, however, is that the long-term health of an organization may be sacrificed as these
managers try to control what inevitably is uncontrollable. A structural shift towards
adhocracy is an alternative:
Indeed, adhocracy contradicts much of what we accept on faith in
organization-consistency in output, control by administrators, unity of
command, strategy emanating from the top. It is a tremendously fluid
structure, in which power is constantly shifting, and coordination and
control are by mutual adjustment through informal communication and
interaction of competent experts.65
The adhocracy structure offers organizations a unconventional alternative that recognizes
the human element as the central organizational driving force.
It is important to note at this point in the discussion of organizational structures that
Mintzberg's descriptions are generalizations; organizations rarely fit neatly into one
organizational structure or another. Organizations are generally more complex entities that
may take on more than one structural form at a time or may even combine elements of a
different structures to create a hybrid. That is why, for instance, we can speak of
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"bureaucratizing" or "adhocratizing" an organization, mixing elements of different
structures. The combinations and possibilities are virtually infinite.
In addition, related literatures have used alternate methods of describing and
grouping organizational structures. Project-oriented firms, such as accounting firms,
aerospace firms, construction firms and real estate development companies, are often
examined against a framework that delineates how their technical specialties are grouped,
how well they are suited to operate in dynamic environments, and how their decision
making processes have been decentralized. 66 It is worth mentioning a few other structures
which have had prominence in the organizational structure literature in recent years,
particularly the functional, project, matrix, and integrated organizational structures. A few
brief definitions are in order:
. A firm that is functionally structured separates its technical skills and
specialties into divisions; the firm's various functions (i.e. valuation, asset
management, property management,...) are functionally grouped into distinct
departments. Functionally structured firms generally opt for decentralized
decision-making and are known to operate well in stable environments. 67
. A firm that is structured to be project-oriented combines members with
different technical or specialty skills into project or client teams; there may be
little association, however, between an individual's technical skills and
department grouping. The project-oriented firm often has decentralized its
decision making processes and operates well in moderately unpredictable,
dynamic environments.68
. An organization that has taken on a matrix structure forms project or client
teams with members retaining relationships and identification with broader
functional skill-based divisions. The matrix structured firm operates best in
66 Bhambri, Arvind, et. al., Strategies and Structures of Real Estate Development Firms: Lessons
from Management Research, 1991, the Urban Land Institute (ULI), Washington, D.C., p. 8.
67 Gordon, Judith, Louis Corsini, and Michael Fretters, "Restructuring Accounting Firms for
Better Client Service," Sloan Management Review, 26: 43-55, Spring 1985.
68 Ibid.
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dynamic, unpredictable markets and is always accompanied by decentralized
decision-making processes.69
. The integrated structured organization emphasizes flexible and market-
oriented grouping of individuals across disciplines and functional divisions.
Relationships, reporting, and communications are complex and difficult to
manage over the long-term. The integrated structure is always accompanied
by decentralized decision-making and is best suited to firms that operate in
dynamic, unpredictable, highly competitive environments.70
These four definitions illustrate an alternate way of describing a firm's structure.
The idea, however, is not to become proficient in being able to define and label an
organization's structure, but to be able to identify an organization's particular
characteristics, its structural elements, that influence its ability to learn and deal effectively
with continuous change. It is less important to peg an organization as being a firm with,
say, a divisionalized form that works as a professional bureaucracy at the subunit level than
it is to understand the impact that this structure may have on the organization's learning
ability.
A firm's ability to learn--its ability to engage in individual and organizational
inquiry, generate feedback, create new ideas, and actively experiment with changes--is
dependent on how its structural elements come together to facilitate or inhibit the learning
process at each stage of the cycle. What are the structural elements that influence a firm's
learning abilities-or disabilities? How can organizational learning and evolutionary
change be facilitated by a firm's structural components?
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- ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS:
Henry Mintzberg outlines several structural elements that serve as the building
blocks for organizational action. How these basic components are assembled defines the
learning ability and flexibility that the organizational structure can support:71
. Specialization of tasks refers to the number of tasks and the complexity
of those tasks that are assigned to a particular job. As referred to earlier, a
firm creates a task system (a division of labor) as it coalesces from a
collectivity into an organization. This gives an initial task system to the firm
which can continue to evolve and become more specialized.
" Formalization of procedures, or behavior formalization, refers to the
standardization of work processes via a firm's explicit organizational maps
(i.e. operating instructions, job descriptions, rules, employee guidelines,
etc...). This is often thought of as "bureaucratizing" the work and
organization.
" Formal training and cultural indoctrination refers to the use of formal
instructional programs used by firms to establish and standardize the
necessary skills, knowledge and company norms (corporate culture) in its
employees.
- Grouping of units refers to the manner in which sectors or functions
within the organization are grouped together into units and how these units are
grouped into higher-order units. The various methods for grouping
organizational units (i.e. by skill base, technology used, product, geography,
client base, etc.) can be summarized into two fundamental categories:
Grouping by thefunction performed, or grouping by the market served.
. Size of each unit refers simply to the number of positions grouped into a
particular unit; this usually correlates directly to the number of employees,
although one employee may serve multiple functions and fill multiple
positions.
71 Op. Cit., Henry Mintzberg, p. 116.
Page 44
Chapter Two
" Action planning and performance control systems are management's
way of standardizing ("bureaucratizing") a firm's or division's outputs.
Action planning is prospective in that it is an attempt to specify the result of
taking a particular action. Control systems are used after-the-fact to evaluate
the performance or quality of a given action or program.
- Liaison devices are used as mechanisms to facilitate communication,
collaboration, and consensus (what Mintzberg calls "mutual adjustment")
among a firm's various units and subunits. These may take many forms,
including integrating managers, formal interdisciplinary meetings, or informal
communications and information sharing among employees.
. Delegation of power is divided between vertical decentralization and
horizontal decentralization. A firm that is vertically decentralized has
delegated much of the decision-making authority and responsibility down its
managerial line of command, often to divisionalized or satellite offices and
their respective chains of command. A firm that has horizontally decentralized
has deliberately incorporated its non-managers--its workers, whether they are
highly skilled professionals or support staff--in the decision-making
processes related to their jobs. Institutional investors often exhibit what
Mintzberg calls limited vertical decentralization or parallel decentralization,
"where managers of market-based units are delegated the power to control
most of the decisions concerning their line units."72
No matter which structure a firm may chose or exhibit, how it approaches each of
these fundamental structural elements has a great impact on its ability to learn and change.
Structural elements, however, are only half of the organizational structure equation. The
other half is made up of what the literatures refer to as elements of situation.
. ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS OF SITUATION:
While structural elements are internal to the organization, situational elements are
generally related to factors external to the organizational entity itself, often things beyond its
control. For the purposes of this thesis, only a few situational elements will be discussed,
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in particular those situational elements related to an organization's "technology" and
"environment."
An organization's "technology" refers how a firm performs its work, how it
transforms its inputs and outputs and adds value in the process. The three most important
aspects of technology that affect an organization's structure (and, therefore, its ability to
learn and change) are complexity, uncertainty, and interdependence. 73
"Complexity" refers to the number of different factors that the firm has to take into
account as it performs its work. A company, for instance, that purchases multi-use, multi-
tenanted commercial properties for third-parties would use more complex technology in its
work than a company that made cash purchases of vacant land for its own portfolio.
Complexity, as a situational element, is directly related to organizational structure in that the
more complex an organization's technology, the more complex its structure will have to be
to accommodate the work.74 For example, as the work gets more complex, the firm needs
to differentiate, but still coordinate, a growing number of related tasks. The complexity of
the firm's structure increases to allow for greater specialization of its workforce as a means
of managing the multiple tasks. This structural complexity is then compounded by the need
to integrate the various differentiated functions and specialists via liaison devices.
"Uncertainty" in the technology refers to the variability or unpredictability of the
elements upon which the work is performed.75 Uncertainty often affects organizational
structure by influencing how a firm's decision-making processes are organized, how
responsibility and authority are distributed. In general, more uncertainty and more
unpredictability means that decisions need to be less standardized. Structurally speaking,
this means that decision-making needs to be more decentralized:
The more uncertain an organization's technology is, the more
decentralized its decision making will need to be and the less formalized its
73 Op. Cit., Arvind Bhambri, et. al., p. 11.
74 Ibid., p. 12.
75 Ibid.
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structure. ...Because McDonald's has a certain technology, decision
making can be centralized and the organizational structure formalized.
Firms involved in management consulting tend to be at the other end of the
spectrum. How the problem is to be solved is not known going in.76
In real estate investment and development, this need for decentralization often seems
counterintuitive to those in control of the decision making process (usually top
management). For instance, when sources of capital are scarce or when costs of capital are
highly variable, the decision to participate in a real estate deal becomes more complex and
risky. Rather than decentralize decision making to rely on the local expertise and the wealth
of accumulated organizational experience, decision making and control tend to become
more centralized.
"Interdependence" in a firm's technology refers to the extent to which a firm's
inputs, outputs and work processes are interrelated to one another; a change in one factor,
may have a great impact on other factors. A change in the vacancy rate of a building or a
change in the applicable market rents charged, for instance, would have a great impact on a
property's value. Similarly, the marketing, brokerage, asset management and valuation
functions of a real estate investment firm must be coordinated to recognize their
interdependence in a real estate organization's work processes:
... the more interdependent an organization's technology is, the more the
organization will need to use coordinating mechanisms [in its structure]
such as task forces, liaison roles, specific integrating departments,
or.. .talented generalists with the ability to appreciate the
interdependencies.??
The technological interdependence of a firm's work processes, therefore, must be
recognized and accommodated in a firm's organizational structure.
These three situational elements related to an organization's technology--
complexity, uncertainty, and interdependence--must be taken into account as part of an
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inquiry into organizational structure. A well-designed organization has a structure that
allows it to perform its work and achieve its mission in an expedient and effective manner.
Its structure allows a range of people and skills to be combined and coordinated in such a
way as to produce something that could not be produced individually:
While each task individually is not technically demanding and would not
require the intellect of a rocket scientist, the number of tasks, the uncertainty
of outcomes at each step, the unknowns, and the interrelatedness can turn a
simple series of tasks into a bewildering maze for the uninitiated.78
Organizational structure that reflects the technological variabilities of the work situation can
serve to orchestrate individual efforts and talents into a successful collective undertaking.
The structure, however, must be open to modification as the situational elements change.
There are also organizational elements that are affected by the environment in which
a firm must operate. A business environment may vary in its complexity, in how dynamic
it is, in its competitive nature, or in its dependence on related industries or markets, to name
but just a few factors. These type of environmental factors, however, tend to affect a
firm's organizational structure in predictable ways. Mintzberg, for instance, has said that
the more complex an environment is, the more need there is for structural decentralization
to help central management collect and comprehend data. 79 He also asserts that more
dynamic markets call for less bureaucratic, less standardized work outputs, skills and
organizational structures.80
Structurally, the pull is between centralization and decentralization of work
processes and decision-making. In times of trouble (a euphemistic description for the
current real estate environment), there is often an organizational dichotomy in which crisis-
management dictates a move towards centralization, but in which the need for greater
integrative flexibility, sources of local information, and depth of organizational experience
78 Ibid.
79 Op. Cit., Henry Mintzberg, p. 116.
80 Ibid.
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(all of which are best attained through decentralization) are sacrificed. Issues relating to
financial control and accountability should not override the long-term benefits of
empowering local expertise and building stronger, reliable, decentralized relationships.
This requires a delicate structural balance or what Archier and Serieyx describe as the
"simultaneous loose-tight" organizational character of a "Type 3 Company": 81
The excellent companies are both centralized and decentralized. For
the most part, as we have said, they have pushed autonomy down to the
shop floor or product-development team. On the other hand, they are
frantic centralists around the few core values they hold dear.82
Real estate--with its buildings, land, loans, tenants, leases, contractors, investors, etc.--is
still a local business based on local expertise and local relationships. This need for
decentralization, particularly during times of adversity, needs to be reflected in the
organizational structure of even the most high-tech and geographically diversified real estate
firms. When markets crash and managers jump into a crisis-management mode, however,
even the most simple and fundamental principles can get lost in the panic. Organizational
change to accommodate new market conditions may be needed. Some firms that are
continuously involved in change and view change as a business lifestyle--such as those set
up as adhocracies--will put their double-loop and deutero-learning thinking caps on; these
firms will motivate their employees to experiment with new ideas and innovative solutions,
even if it means reorganizing the firm itself. Other firms that opt more for revolution than
evolution will wait until the external stress is too great; while they may make minor
adjustments along the way, they will only make major, painful structural changes when
forced:
Unfortunately, some managers take a more passive approach to
minimizing the risk inherent in change by waiting until a situation is so dire
that staying the same may involve a greater risk than making change....
81 Archier, Georges, and Herve Serieyx, The Type 3 Company, 1987, Nichols Publishing
Company, New York, p. 36.82 Ibid., attributed to Peters and Waterman from their book In Search of Excellence.
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The greatest drawback to a last resort approach to organizational
change is that, by then, one of your most valuable resources will likely be in
short supple. That resource is time.... When the business itself is in serious
trouble, time tends to be used to fightfires, rather than to perform careful
analysis and planning for the future.83
And then there are those firms that, no matter how well intentioned, cannot seem to
make significant organizational changes. These firms are blocked and have learning
disabilities that can ultimately lead to organizational obsolescence-and insolvency.
OBSTACLES TO CHANGE:
All organizations, no matter how well structured, enlightened or progressive need
to be aware of potential learning disabilities which can act as obstacles to organizational
change. The structural components of some firms lead to a short-circuiting of the learning
process at a critical point in the four stage cycle; others may deliberately pursue a strategy to
discourage change in order to maintain internal consistency and a reassuring image of
stability. While learning disabilities can come in an almost infinite variety of both structural
and strategic forms, the following is an outline of some of the more prevalent
organizational obstacles to change.
Competency traps:
Sometimes effective learning strategy is counterintuitive. Organizations, for
instance, need to be wary of success because it can lead to what is known as a "competency
trap." 84 Organizations, like individuals, build their competence in the skills and procedures
that lead to desirable outcomes. Individuals tend to trust what has worked for them, and
organizations, as collections of individuals, tend to trust and standardize those behaviors
and processes that have lead to past success. In time, however, this leads an organization
83 Op. Cit., Emily E. Schultheiss, p. 23.
84 Levitt, Barbara and James G. March, "Organizational Learning," The Annual Review of
Sociology, Volume 14, 1988, p. 322.
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to rely on the skills that help it to maintain a satisfactory status quo. An organization that
is not continuously in the process of questioning its normative processes risks becoming so
invested in a particular way of doing things that it resists change-it gets trapped by its
own competence:
... a competency trap can occur when favorable performance with an
inferior procedure leads an organization to accumulate more experience with
it, thus keeping experience with a superior procedure inadequate to make it
rewarding to use.85
A classic example of such a competency trap is when a worker becomes proficient with a
particular computer system, and resists changing to another, even better, system. The
worker is loyal to the behaviors and processes in which he or she has become invested and
grown competent; change, particularly when it has not been precipitated by an identifiable
failure, is threatening. In general, "non-failure" related experience with a particular
procedure or technology leads individuals and organizations to persist in using procedures
or technologies that may be far from optimal.86
Similarly, when an organizational structure or strategy works, a firm must still
periodically ask itself if it has worked well enough-is there a better way? If a firm waits
until it experiences "failure" before it questions its normative processes, it will not engage
in the higher-order forms of learning that result in organizational change. In addition,
success is not easy to define in such a difficult real estate market. Some institutional real
estate investor's may view "success" in today's market not in terms of who profits most,
but as a matter who loses the least or who will survive until conditions improve. While
merely maintaining the status quo may seem like an achievement, companies need to strive
for more. Firms need to adapt to market changes--to learn and to evolve--in both good
times and bad.
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Misinterpretation of Causal Relationships:
A clear cause and effect relationship in complex business situations is difficult to
definitively trace or understand. Outcome-oriented learning (i.e., single-loop learning) can
lead to "solutions" that are predicated on improper assumptions. 87 Sometimes this takes
the form of "superstitious learning" in which subjective experience seems compelling, but
the connections between organizational actions and outcomes are unclear. 88 Did new
elevators in an office building make the property more competitive and more profitable, or
were other factors involved (i.e., new property management, fortuitous lease renewals,
debt refinancing, etc.)? Should other underperforming office buildings be given costly
physical upgrades?
Individuals have a need to impose a sense of order on their world, especially when
faced with ambiguous or unpredictable situations. The problem can be compounded in an
organizational setting, particularly when individuals or groups are called upon to
demonstrate their competence. Organizational behavior, therefore, often encourages
individuals to make tacit, if not explicit, assumptions about causal relationships. If an
individual misinterprets the cause of a particular outcome at any stage within the learning
cycle, the organization can develop a learning disability and its future ability to adapt may
be impaired.
- Organizational Mythology:
Every organization has its own form of normative behavior, its own set of values
and "corporate culture." Common interpretation of past events, collective understandings
of company history, and shared perceptions of experience can create a strong organizational
mythology. Organizations tend to perpetuate their mythology as "participants collude in
support of interpretations that sustain the myths." 89 Any individual or group action that
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threatens this mythology may be met with indifference or even intolerance. A learning
organization is always in the process of questioning its values and redefining itself as it
evolves. Organizations that block this process in order to preserve their mythology create
obstacles to change.
Individual Non-enrollment:
Organizations are complex entities made up of groups, sub-groups and individuals.
Each may have a different perspective or definition of success, as well as a different
interpretation of a firm's experience. Well-defined organizational targets and missions can
help to orchestrate this diversity of opinions and efforts into a productive collective effort; if
all participants are at least moving in the same direction, the organization can grow and
evolve. However, individuals or groups that even tacitly oppose the direction being
pursued will either contribute nothing to the effort or, worse yet, may actively block
organizational activity. 90 Individuals, therefore, need to become enrolled in an
organization's overall mission and in the incremental goals that often serve as discrete
learning experiences along the way.
Crisis Management:
When markets are turbulent and organizations face unusual difficulties, it is easy for
individuals to suspend normative practices and to slip into a crisis management mode-the
instinct for survival can be overpowering. Crisis management, however, is nothing more
than an organization's way of suspending its long-term objectives in order to meet more
urgent short-term needs.91 As a short-term strategy, crisis management may be effective,
but it presents a danger if it persists long after it is appropriate and productive.
To managers and workers grasping to gain control over unstable or threatening
conditions, crisis management may seem more entrepreneurial and dynamic. It can result,
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however, in organizational learning disabilities as innovations and learning-induced
changes often fail to become recorded in a firm's "organizational memory." If the crisis
mentality outlasts the actual precipitating crisis, the long-term objectives and well-being of
the organization can be overlooked. If care is not taken to embed short-term innovations
into the organization's long-term normative behavior, success can be ephemeral.
Bureaucratic Controls:
Another danger of crisis management is that is often leads to bureaucratic obstacles
to change. Organizations must strike a balance between their need for control and
continuity and their need to remain flexible and adaptive. Particularly when trouble
abounds, organizational experience and trusted relationships can be lost as turnover of
personnel increases; 92 financial controls are often tightened to enhance reporting
capabilities and reassure top management or stockholders and work processes; and outputs
become more standardized. As the organization becomes more bureaucratic, it creates new
sets of rules and routines-and then rewards individuals for compliance.
When organizations must exist in chaotic environments, their defense mechanism is
to impose order, to control whatever can be controlled. Predictability is comforting while
surprise-even serendipitous surprise-is distressing. The net effect is to stifle individual
creativity, create organizational advocates for routines, and encourage rule zealotry. 93
Organizational bureaucracies also tend to discount the importance of innovation and
surprise as fortuitous engines of unexpected experimentation and success. When creativity
and experimentation are impeded, the learning cycle is disrupted.
Communication Barriers:
Feedback and information sharing are critical elements in the collective process of
the organizational learning cycle. Firms that encourage formal and informal communication
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provide better access to information and facilitate collaborative inquiry. Organizations,
however, unwittingly create incentive for territorial protection of information by rewarding
individual performance. 94 Similarly, individuals or departments are given a disincentive to
share information if they have reason to believe they will be punished, or at least not
rewarded, for disclosing disappointing results. Firms that inhibit communication and
collaborative interaction by allowing or incentivizing individuals to withhold information
create functional learning disabilities and, consequently, obstacles to organizational
evolution.
Organizations need to understand that the experimentation phase of the learning
cycle does not always lead to improvement or success. Organizations must expect and
make allowances for a healthy level of failure.95
Put simply, because many professionals are almost always
successful at what they do, they rarely experience failure. And because they
have rarely failed, they have never learned how to learn from failure. So
whenever their single-loop learning strategies go wrong, they become
defensive, screen out criticism, and put the "blame" on anyone and
everyone but themselves. In short, their ability to learn shuts down
precisely at the moment they need it the most.96
Individuals need to be given the license to fail if they are called upon to risk success. While
interim goals should be recognized and rewarded, a firm's compensation system should be
tied to organizational (not individual) performance which can only be effectively gauged
over the long-term.
- CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS:
The framework for organizational change outlined in this chapter serves as a basis
to explore the organizational structures and learning abilities of institutional real estate
94 Ibid., p. 331.
95 Ibid., p. 334.
96 Argyris, Chris, "Teaching Smart People How to Learn," Harvard Business Review, May-June
1991, p. 100.
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investment firms. The following chapters use this framework to compare two firms that
have experienced varying degrees of real estate trouble and have exhibited different
preferences for organizational change. General conclusions presented in the final chapter
of this thesis will draw from these two cases and the academic framework presented here.
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CHAPTER THREE
. FIELD RESEARCH DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS:
The Real Estate Crisis and The Insurance Industry:
Enormous change has occurred in the last few years within the commercial real
estate industry, the scale of which is only now being recognized. For instance, the total
value of U.S. commercial real estate, estimated at about $3.5 trillion in 1989, has declined
by approximately 30%-a loss of about $1 trillion. 1 Comparatively speaking, this loss
amounts to nearly twice the dollar amount lost in the U.S. stock market during the
October 19, 1987 crash. Institutional investors would like to believe that values cannot
decline much further, but recent reports say that overall real estate values may decline by
another 15% or more in the coming year.2 The future stakes are enormous, as pointed out
in greater detail in Chapter One.
Institutional real estate investors have no taxpayer financed government safety-
net, no comparable government bailout on the scale of the savings and loan industry
rescue, waiting in the wings. The institutional real estate investment community is on its
own and individual firms, therefore, must recognize the fundamental changes that have
occurred and must adapt their organizations to do business in this new environment.
Those that adapt will survive; those that learn to evolve along with the incremental shifts
in the business environment may have an even better chance at prospering.
Falling property values, soaring vacancy rates and tight credit markets, however,
have brought financial illiquidity--and even insolvency--to some of the formerly most
stable institutional real estate investors. The corporate instinct for survival has taken over
as managers talk about making their firms leaner, smarter, and more efficient. But what
do these words mean? It is relatively easy to trim staff and eliminate unnecessary
expenses, but are institutional investors making changes that will actually make their
1 Loomis, Carol J., "Victims of the Real Estate Crash," Fortune, May 18, 1992, p. 70.
2 Hemmerick, Steve, "Real estate may drop 15% more," Pensions & Investments, April 27, 1992,
p.35.
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organizations smarter and more competitive? Can organizational restructuring be used as
an effective intervention strategy to allow firms to more effectively deal with change?
All types of institutional investors are experiencing their share of real estate
related trouble. Already over 700 banks have failed and, according to the Congressional
Budget Office, another 600 thrifts will need to be taken over by the RTC. 3 The mightiest
real estate empires have been decimated as evidenced by Olympia & York Development
Ltd.'s Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. Westinghouse Financial Services, an institutional
finance company that is a subsidiary of Westinghouse Electric, lost almost $2.5 billion in
since 1990, most of which was attributed to commercial real estate problems.4
The most surprising news for the average citizen, however, may be that the
insurance companies--those supposedly unsinkable bastions of stability whose primary
mission is to come to the rescue when, all around, the world seems to be crumbling--have
been rocked by the current real estate crisis. Liquidity problems and huge portfolios of
real estate equity and debt exposure spell trouble for most insurance companies.
. THE LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY'S INVESTMENT IN REAL ESTATE
How much real estate exposure do the insurance companies have? It is difficult to
quantify precisely, but recent reports state that life insurers have about $303 billion
invested commercial real estate on their own behalf ($256 billion in commercial
mortgage loans and $47 billion in direct equity ownership). 5 This figure, however, is
only what the insurers have invested for their own accounts; investing for the accounts of
others makes up a substantial portion of the insurers real estate investment management
business. We know, for instance, that the pension funds have most of their $100 billion
in real estate investments managed by insurance company realty managers. The total
3 Tetzeli, Rick, "S&L Bailout Stalls-And More Will Fall," Fortune, July 12, 1992, p. 12.
4 Op. Cit., Carol J. Loomis, p. 73.
5 Ibid., p. 73.
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exposure by the insurance companies, therefore, may approach nearly a half trillion
dollars.
The following table gives a status report, as of December 31, 1991, of the ten
largest life insurance companies ranked in order of their total dollar amount of real estate
exposure:6
Prudential of America
Totalt
as of
12/31/91
in millions
$29,200
Total
as a % of
policyholder's
surplus
447%
Nonperforming
(loans and
foreclosed
properties)
in millions
$858
Nonperforming
as a % of total
surplus funds
in millions
13.1%
Metropolitan Life $27,867 585% $1,725 36.2%
Teachers Insurance & $21,945 718% $1,581 51.7%
Annuity
Aetna Life $19,071 1,028% $2,150 115.9%
Travelers $13,404 654% $3,260 159.1%
Equitable Life Assurance $12,173 1,100% $765 69.1%
John Hancock Mutual Life $11,135 705% $534 33.8%
Connecticut General Life $10,081 673% $593 39.6%
Northwestern Mutual Life $6,998 423% $131 7.9%
New York Life $6,900 263% $417 15.9%
t The total asset amounts do not include real estate held in joint ventures
or separate accounts managed for customers.
After the insolvencies of Executive Life Insurance and Mutual Benefit Life
Insurance, the U.S. Congress is considering federal regulation of the insurance industry, 7
but regulation neither promises a taxpayer financed bailout nor an intelligent restructuring
of those individual organizations beset with problems. Insurance companies need to face
their own troubles and must learn how to use restructuring as an organizational
intervention strategy to more effectively deal with the new set of real estate challenges
6 Table based on information given in a Fortune Table, "Victims of the Real Estate Crash,"
Fortune, May 18, 1992, p. 76.
7 Ibid., p. 78.
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they now face. Some firms, for instance, that were primarily lenders must now adopt an
owner's perspective as the number of defaults and foreclosures swell their REO (real
estate owned) portfolios. Conversely, firms that were borrowers or took equity positions
in real estate investments must understand the needs of lenders and the sophisticated
mechanics of debt restructuring. Even those real estate assets that are relatively healthy
need to be well-managed so that they weather the market turbulence and maintain or
improve performance. Asset management, consequently, is a growing technical specialty
that has applications for both performing and non-performing assets.
- FIELD RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:
The next sections of this thesis present data regarding the organizational structure
and organizational learning capabilities of two insurance company affiliated real estate
firms, Equitable Real Estate Investment Management Company Inc. and the Travelers
Realty Investment Company. The local Boston offices of these two firms were chosen
because they represent two institutional investment companies from the same industry
that are experiencing different amounts of trouble in their respective portfolios of real
estate assets. Equitable's troubled asset problems are relatively minor, while Travelers'
real estate related problems are massive. These two field research sites held potential for
undertaking a comparative analysis of institutional investors. Field research and
interviews conducted at these two real estate investment firms allowed for a comparison
of their internal operations, organizational structures, and organizational learning
capacities..
Interviews were conducted with key personnel of the local Boston offices of these
two firms. At Equitable Real Estate, three of the five functional discipline heads, as well
as the head of the office and two other regional manager were interviewed. A total of
nine interviews were conducted with five different individuals at the Boston Equitable
Real Estate office representing over 10 hours of interviewing. Interviews generally
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averaged a little over an hour each. The head of the Travelers Realty office and two of
the three other loan officers were interviewed. This represented a majority of the entire
office's professional staff. Five interviews were conducted representing about six hours
of meetings.
Specific questions were posed to each of the interviewees at the two firms to
gather information about:
. The historical background relating to the organizational structure and
business strategy of each firm;
- The status of each local office's real estate portfolio with respect to
performing and non-performing assets;
. Changes that have led to the acquisition of new skills or a redeployment of
existing organizational resources;
- The degree of functional skills and decision making authority that had been
centralized or decentralized;
- The formal and informal information sharing venues developed to facilitate
communications among office personnel and between levels of
organizational hierarchy; and
. Differences between the firm's formal organizational structure--its division
of labor and organizational chart--and its tacit operational way of doing
business.
This information is presented and analyzed against the frameworks for
organizational structure and organizational learning discussed in Chapter Two. The
information gathered from Equitable Real Estate and Travelers Realty is presented first in
a tabular form for ease of reference then discussed in greater detail in the following
sections to allow for more in-depth comparison and analysis. This information was
reviewed and checked for accuracy by each firm prior to its inclusion in this thesis in
final form.
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- FIELD RESEARCH DATA COMPARATIVE MATRIX:
EQUITABLE REAL ESTATE TRAVELERS REALTY
Total Portfolio Value $37 billion $15 billion
Boston Office Portf. Value $1.5 billion $500 million
Percentage of Total
Portfolio Classified as 6% 36%
"Non-Performing"
Business Focus 1.) Asset management 1.) Workouts
2.) New business 2.) Asset management
Significant Business - Demutualizing - Credit-rating lowered
Factors & Considerations - Public image sensitivity o Negative media attention
. Liquidity problems o Liquidity problems
Business Strategy * Maintain stability and * Restructure organization
internal consistency - Foreclose and manage
. Better asset performance troubled assets in-house
Organizational Structure . Divisionalized with . Decentralized operations
decentralized operations (becoming more centralized)
- Professional bureaucracy . Professional bureaucracy
Vertical integration of - Vertical integration of
functional disciplines functional generalists
Field Office - Regional office manager - Office manager
Management Functional discipline supervises tech/prof staff
heads o Corporate office
supervises local
administrative staff
Responsibility * Decentralized - Decentralized
Authority & - Centralized . Centralized
Decision Making
Turnover & o Stable o New corporate leader
Personnel Shifts (workout specialist)
. High incidence of internal
personnel shifting
Evolution vs. Revolution - Revolution o Was revolution
- Now more evolution
Types of - Primarily single-loop - Mostly single-loop
Learning Exhibited - Some double-loop o Some double-loop
- Possibly deutero-learning
Information Sharing - Annual business plan . Annual portfolio review
& Information Access review . Circulation of staff
. Circulation of written meeting minutes
portfolio activity reports * Company-wide computer
* Company-wide computer network
network
Reactive vs. Proactive * Reactive o Primarily reactive
. Some proactive
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. EQUITABLE REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT INC.:
Equitable Real Estate Investment Management Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary
of the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U.S., the nation's fifth largest life
insurance company. The primary function of Equitable Real Estate is to manage all of its
parent company's real estate assets and to manage real estate investments for third
parties. Equitable Real Estate participates in debt and equity real estate investments for
its own account and "the accounts of others" throughout all major U.S. markets, Canada,
and Puerto Rico. Its third party investment management business grew significantly in
the 1980's with the influx of capital from the domestic pension market, including both
public and private funds; the Far Eastern market, particularly Japanese funds; and the
European market, predominantly British, Dutch and Middle Eastern funds.
Equitable Life's real estate portfolio is valued in 1992 at about $14 billion with $4
billion in equity investments and $10 million in debt.8 Adding third party investments
(mostly from pension funds) brings Equitable's total real estate portfolio to about $37
billion. 9 The Boston office currently manages a portfolio of real estate valued at about
$1.5 billion, with approximately $1 billion in equity investments and about $500 million
in debt. Approximately 6% of Equitable's real estate portfolio is considered "non-
performing" (60 days or more past due). The Boston office of Equitable Real Estate has
had relatively few troubled assets either on the equity or debt side and, according to the
office's regional manager, does not have any workout situations remaining in its
portfolio. As a borrower, this regional office has defaulted on only one loan in the past
12 months (which it did, it said, in a strategic move to force its lender to the negotiating
table).10 As a lender, it has had to foreclose on only two mortgages within the past eight
8 Figures provided by the Executive Vice President, Equitable Real Estate Investment
Management Inc., Boston, MA, June 17, 1992.
9 Ibid.
10 Interview with the Vice President, Valuation, Equitable Real Estate Investment Management
Inc., Boston, MA, June 30, 1992.
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years, both owing to what was referred to as mismanagement on the part of the
borrowers. With few troubled assets and no workouts in its portfolio, Equitable Real
Estate's Boston office is able to focus its efforts on asset management and new business.
According to the office's regional manager, the biggest challenges facing the firm are
"how to get existing assets to perform better and how to find new business in a
marketplace that will basically be stagnant for the next few years." 11
Equitable Real Estate's parent company, Equitable Life, is in the process of
converting from a mutually-held (policyholder owned) to a publicly-held (stockholder
owned) company. This process of demutualizing is being undertaken in an effort to raise
new capital to bolster the company's liquidity. The firm's initial stock offering occurred
in July, 1992 at about $9.00 per share, less than originally expected. This initial public
offering raised about $450 million in new capital and triggered an automatic conversion
from debt to equity of a $1 billion investment by the large French insurance firm, Groupe
Axa S.A.
This move to demutualize and the need to raise new capital appear to have
influenced Equitable Real Estate's choice of business strategy. The firm's strategy has
been to maintain its internal consistency and to focus on improving the yield of its
portfolio of mostly performing assets. The firm's choice to preserve its organizational
status quo--rather than, for instance, restructuring to pursue emerging opportunities--
enables it to project an image of stability at a time when it is particularly vulnerable to
stockholder and media scrutiny. The perceived stability and financial health of the firm
can have an impact on its investment credit rating and on its stock value, especially since
life insurers are generally considered to be having real estate problems. In comparison to
some of its competitors who are struggling with huge numbers of troubled assets and
workouts, and in contrast to a real estate market that is in turmoil, Equitable appears solid
11 Interview with the Boston Regional Office Manager, Executive Vice President, Equitable Real
Estate Investment Management Inc., Boston, MA, June 17, 1992.
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and healthy. Equitable Real Estate is run as an independent business with its parent
company, Equitable Life, as its largest client. Headquartered in Atlanta, Equitable Real
Estate maintains 14 regional offices, each charged with the responsibility for all general
real estate activities within its designated geographic area. Each office must have the
functional skills to manage and advise a diversified client base on all types of real estate
products and investments. As a full-service investment manager, Equitable Real Estate
must be able to approach real estate investments from either the perspective of borrower
or lender. Describing the individual regional offices, the head of the Boston office says,
"Each office is run like a mini real estate company. We are
expected to raise our own capital, invest that capital, manage the
investment, and dispose of it. We are each a full-service real
estate company." 12
Equitable Real Estate's organizational structure has remained relatively consistent over
the last decade. The firm exhibits characteristics of a divisionalized structure with
decentralized regional offices that operate as professional bureaucracies. The firm's
division of labor is defined by functional disciplines that are vertically integrated between
its corporate and regional offices. Each of the firm's regional offices is structurally
organized around five functional disciplines:
New Business Development (also referred to as the Production Department)
is responsible for identifying investment opportunities for various sources of
capital and for preparing financial analyses to support the firm's acquisition
and investment decision making processes. This department is also
responsible for investigating and outlining the proposed structure of both
equity and debt transactions. Technical skills including financial analysis,
negotiation, and communication are essential to carrying out this
department's responsibilities.
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- Valuation is responsible for performing appraisals, feasibility studies and
market analyses to support the firm's acquisition, disposition, mortgage
lending, and portfolio review activities. The valuation department's role is
integral to evaluating both proposed new business and existing assets.
Appraisal skills (including an MAI or "Member Appraisal Institute"
designation), sophisticated valuation expertise, and associated computer
proficiency are all necessary to perform the valuation department's
functions. In addition, the valuation department is expected to develop and
maintain good working relationships with the local real estate brokerage and
appraisal communities to cultivate reliable sources of market information.
. Asset Management provides investment management services for
Equitable's own portfolio of real estate assets. Each asset manager serves as
a liaison among owners, investors, property managers, and Equitable
technical staff (i.e., appraisers, accountants, financial analysts, etc.). An
asset manager's portfolio is client-oriented (centered around owners and
investors) rather than property-specific; while other functional divisions may
apply their respective technical skills to any property, asset managers work
primarily with their own designated portfolio of properties. Asset
management is, in this respect, more relationship-oriented than the other
functional disciplines.
. Financial Services provides the accounting and auditing support required to
track and report on operations and investments. Financial Services
functions in a controller's capacity to provide budgeting, monitoring, and
financial control (i.e., taxes, accounting, collections, and disbursements) to
the other divisions.
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. Property Management is provided by a separate, wholly-owned division
called the Compass Group. Compass provides maintenance, leasing and
management services at individual properties on a contractual basis. As the
group directly responsible for the daily operations at each property,
Compass works closely with asset management to provide overall
investment management services for both Equitable's own portfolio and its
clients' portfolios.
Each functional area is set up as its own department with a group leader who
reports to the head of the regional office; the regional office manager, in turn, reports to
corporate management in Atlanta. The functional disciplines are structurally mirrored at
the corporate level and regional discipline heads report to their counterparts at the
corporate level. This vertical integration allows each regional office's work to be
reviewed and coordinated on a company-wide basis. For instance, the corporate office
can use its macro view to match sources of capital with appropriate investments to build a
well-balanced portfolio of assets. The corporate office can also evaluate the 14 regional
offices' individual portfolios to achieve diversification of product and financing
structures to mitigate risk.
The firm has decentralized functional responsibilities to give it the ability to
manage its real estate investments and relationships on a local basis. Authority and
decision making, however, have been centralized in Equitable Real Estate's home office.
The head of the regional office has enough authority to manage his or her office's
functional responsibilities, but the corporate office in Atlanta retains ultimate authority
over most major portfolio related decisions. This organizational structure appears to give
the home office greater control of financial decisions while allowing it to capitalize on its
wealth of local expertise. For example, the regional valuation department might perform
an appraisal on a potential investment property using its local contacts and knowledge to
establish a current market value. This appraisal is then forwarded to the corporate level
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valuation department (which is staffed with its own team of MAI appraisers) where the
appraisal is reviewed for accuracy and depth of analysis. The corporate valuation
department either approves the regional appraisal or disapproves it and sends it back to
the regional valuation department for revision. Once approved, the appraisal may then
used by the regional office's new business department as it performs its acquisition
analysis of a proposed investment and forwards its analysis and recommendations to its
corporate counterpart. The corporate new business department uses the regional office's
analysis to develop its own recommendation. This recommendation is then submitted to
a corporate level conference committee which has the ultimate new investment decision
making authority. The vertical integration of functional disciplines, therefore, serves as a
key structural element that allows the firm to operate with decentralized responsibility
and centralized authority. This structure and operational approach have allowed
Equitable to build and manage a relatively sound portfolio of real estate assets. As the
real estate market remains highly unpredictable, Equitable seems to be trying to reinforce
its sense of internal stability by centralizing authority and decision making to an even
greater extent: "There's much more communication and less autonomy now than there
ever was," according to the Boston office's regional manager.
The firm's staffing has also remained relatively stable with little turnover or
unusual movement of personnel between offices. The trends in personnel additions,
promotions and attrition have remained consistent over the last few years, even while the
real estate market has become more dynamic and troubled. Many of the individuals
interviewed in the Boston office had been with the firm for over 10 years and had
acquired much of their professional experience under Equitable's auspices. (One
manager interviewed had over 30 years invested with Equitable.) This low incidence of
employee turnover may be another factor that contributes to the organization's stability.
At a time when external markets are distressed, it appears that Equitable is
primarily concerned with maintaining the status quo of its structure, staffing and
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operations. As would be expected, therefore, most of the evidence of organizational
learning found at the Boston office took the form of single-loop, error correction learning.
Double-loop learning appears to occur much less frequently and is primarily associated
with the company's annual business plan review process. The firm, however, does
appear to regularly engage in single-loop learning to carry out its operational functions.
For example, as the asset evaluation and investment decision making process has grown
more complex over the past decade, the valuation department has had to acquire new
financial skills and better technology to keep up with the demand for more sophisticated
appraisal analyses:
"We have increased our computer skills and depth of
financial analyses over the years. Ten years ago, we used to just
crank out numbers on our Hewlett-Packard calculators and do it
all by hand. Now we use computers. Our level of analysis and our
depth of analysis is greater. Discounted cash flows were used
before, but we relied more on direct capitalization in our
valuation. Now we always use discounted cashflows." 13
At incremental steps along the way, the company's information requirements exceeded its
valuation department's ability to provide such sophisticated data on a regular basis. In a
simplified sense, there was an "error" in the firm's ability meet its own information
needs. The organization "corrected" this by upgrading its financial analysis standard and
by enhancing its technology processing capability:
"I remember when we used to use tables to do our work,
using mostly cap rates. Then we used the HP-80 [calculator] to do
cash flow analysis, then HP-12's to do internal rates of return.
Now we use computers. The business is much more information
intensive now and as we [Equitable Life] demutualize, we will need
to provide quarterly performance results to our stockholders." 14
13 Op. Cit., interview with the Vice President, Valuation, June 30, 1992 interview.
14 Interview with a Regional Manager, Equitable Real Estate Investment Management Inc.,
Boston, MA, June 30, 1992 interview.
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Enhancing the firm's information processing ability to meet growing demands is an
example of single-loop learning. The firm's financial analysis output needed to keep up
with industry standards, so the organization made changes in its work processes to
maintain its valuation capacity and competence. When the firm corrects other "errors,"
such as when it changes the asset mix in its portfolio, increases communications with its
clients, or forecloses on a troubled loan, it is making a decision based on this type of
single-loop, outcome-oriented learning.
Higher-order forms of learning that require the firm to question its organizational
structure, processes and values--its normative behavior--seem to occur much less
frequently. Individuals appear to be less concerned with engaging in double-loop or
deutero-learning to foster structural change within the organization:
"...If I get a brainwave and think of a new way for the
company to get new business, that's great and I'll pass it on, but
that's not my principal role." 15
While single-loop learning allows individuals to perform their respective functions and
helps the firm to maintain consistency in its operations and structure, double-loop and
deutero-learning--and the change they foster--seem to be less of a priority.
Equitable Real Estate does, however, exhibit the potential to engage in higher-
order learning. The firm has formalized opportunities for individuals and groups to have
access to information and to share information. Bi-weekly staff meetings encourage
formal interdisciplinary communication and the sharing of information. Members also
spend a significant amount of time listening to and reflecting on the others' experiences.
Information sharing and reflective observation are key steps in the organizational learning
cycle. 16 These regular meetings provide a venue for the type of double-loop
15 Interview with the Vice President, Production, Equitable Real Estate Investment Management
Inc., Boston, MA, July 9, 1992.16 The Lewin Experiential Learning Cycle is presented in greater detail in Chapter Two.
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organizational inquiry that can allow the firm to more deeply question its way of doing
business and can potentially lead to structural change.
Similar potential for higher-order learning has been created by the firm's other
means of sharing information throughout its decentralized structure. All major portfolio
related actions are written up in "executive summary" reports that are forwarded to the
corporate office for distribution throughout the company. While these often lead to
simple error correction type learning, they do give individuals the ability to assess the
firm's processes, as well as results. The written summaries have the ability to facilitate
the type of learning that can lead to changes in Equitable's normative behavior. In
addition, the 14 regional offices have access to loan and property-specific information
from any of the other office's portfolio via a company computer network. While this type
of information access is not sufficient on its own to produce higher-order learning, it does
contribute to the company's potential to engage in more meaningful forms of
organizational inquiry.
Equitable Real Estate also has potential to engage in higher-order learning at both
the regional and corporate levels when it undertakes its annual business plan review.
Each regional office assembles a two-year business plan that serves as its operational
guide. A regional office plan includes annual budgets, profit and loss statements, and
income projections for each functional discipline. The annual planning process requires
individuals at various levels and within different functional disciplines to share
information. For example, the head of the Boston region coordinates his office's effort
and receives input from each of its discipline heads. His office's regional business plan
addresses the prospects for generating fees from mortgage origination and new business,
asset management, asset disposition, and property management (via its Compass group)
and makes income projections based on these assessments. The annual business plan
review is an "intraspective" process; it requires creative strategizing in which participants
are encouraged to come up with ideas for new ways to generate income.
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"We might ask ourselves can we do more business with
Wall Street? Can we access public funds? Not only can we do it,
but how do we do it?" 17
The corporate office reviews each of the 14 regional business plans and assembles
them to build a five-year strategic plan, adding its own budgeting and projections for the
third, fourth and fifth years. This comprehensive corporate plan evaluates each of the
vertically integrated functional disciplines to identify and track trends in each of the
firm's businesses. (Each discipline is thought of as a separate business for this purpose.)
This allows the firm to make decisions about whether it should continue to pursue a
particular line of business or whether its strategic objectives need to be modified. This
process provides the corporate office with an annual opportunity to reflect on operations
and to modify its business strategy. It also gives the home office, regional manager and
the other discipline heads the ability to do comprehensive, long-range planning that may
lead to organizational structural changes. If the loan servicing business, for instance,
looks like it may prove to be profitable in coming years, a decision may be made to grow
that particular discipline and to devote additional organizational resources to that
objective. Such deliberate new business strategizing has recently allowed Equitable to
secure loan and portfolio servicing contracts from the RTC. Whether this is indicative of
single-loop learning or double-loop learning, however, is not clear. If it represents a
fundamental change in the way individuals work together and think, it may be indicative
of higher-order learning. If it is simply a way of doing better what the firm already
knows how to do, it represents single-loop learning.
Even if these types of business strategizing do represent instances of higher-order
learning, they are examples of learning that are occurring on a periodic, irregular basis.
Bi-weekly meetings and annual reviews that provide merely the potential for double-loop
17 Interview with the Boston Regional Office Manager, Executive Vice President, Equitable Real
Estate Investment Management Inc., Boston, MA, July 15, 1992.
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and deutero-learning do not give the firm the ability to continuously adapt. This,
however, does not appear to be one of the firm's goals. Equitable Real Estate has
exhibited a preference for maintaining internal consistency and for approaching
organizational structural change, not in terms of evolution, but in terms of periodic
"quantum" revolution. 18 While this may give the firm greater stability, avoiding internal
change in a dynamic market tends to make the firm more reactive than proactive in
nature:
"We tend to respond to changes as they occur, such as
changes in regulations or market demand. Sometimes we will
target a new business, but the decision to pursue new business is
P&L [profit and loss] driven, it's bottom-line oriented. The
marketplace dictates that change. ...We try to anticipate change,
but the reality is that it occurs internally much closer to when it is
happening [externally]." 19
Perhaps if the organization was not so dependent on the annual business plan review to
engage in its reflective inquiry and learning process, if a more continuous process of
double-loop learning took place, Equitable Real Estate could make structural
modifications on a more evolutionary and proactive basis. It is not clear from the
research that was conducted whether more evolution--incremental change--would make
the firm any less stable or would affect its ability to project a solid, financially sound
image. Clearly, however, Equitable Real Estate appears to be putting off organizational
change as a strategic objective in order to achieve greater internal consistency.
18 Refers to Henry Mintzberg's theory of "evolution vs. revolution" in structural reorganization
and Daniel Miller's "quantum theory" of structural change as described in Chapter Two of this thesis.
19 Op. Cit., interview with the Boston Regional Office Manager, July 15, 1992.
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THE TRAVELERS REALTY INVESTMENT COMPANY:
The Travelers Realty Investment Company (TRIC), headquartered in Hartford, is
the real estate subsidiary of the Travelers Insurance Company. TRIC's real estate
portfolio is valued in 1992 at about $15 billion, 36% of which is considered non-
performing. In comparison to other life insurance companies, Travelers has the second
highest percentage of non-performing mortgages in its portfolio. 20 (Only Aetna Life has
a larger percentage of mortgages that are at least 90 days overdue.) Travelers Realty also
leads the industry with 45% of its mortgages in foreclosure.2 1 TRIC's Boston office
currently manages a portfolio of real estate loans--no equity assets--worth about $500
million. In response to its growing real estate problems, TRIC officially exited the new
mortgage business in March of 1991 and has now focused its business on workouts and
asset management.
Citing the company's real estate troubles, Moody's Investor Service Inc. and
Standard & Poors Corp. both downgraded Travelers' financial strength rating to Baa-1
from A-2 (a two notch drop) in June, 1992.22 Travelers' rating is now lower than all but
a handful of the nation's largest life insurance companies tracked by the investment
ratings services. 23 Adding to the firm's problems is the negative media attention it has
received over the last year profiling its real estate, credit rating and liquidity troubles.
Travelers' real estate problems may be more conspicuous because the company, after it
recognized the severity of its situation, appears to have changed its business strategy.
Unlike Equitable Real Estate, which has pursued a strategy of maintaining its stability
and internal consistency, TRIC has undertaken a series of organizational restructurings.
It appears as if TRIC has changed its strategic focus to allow it to foreclose on its
20 Industry information as of December, 31, 1991, Townsend and Schupp, as reported in the May
18, 1992 issue of National Underwriter.
21 Ibid.
22 Pulliam, Susan, "Travelers Unit's Financial-Strength Rating is Reduced," The Wall Street
Journal, June 5, 1992, p. B5.
23 Ibid.
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growing number of non-performing loans. This allows the firm to take control of its
workout situations and to manage its troubled assets in-house. Asset management,
therefore, also seems to be playing a much more significant role in TRIC's operations.
Travelers Realty's organizational structure has undergone much change since
October 31, 1988 when a workout specialist from Citibank, Allan Schuster, was brought
in as the firm's new president and CEO. TRIC has flattened its hierarchy, closed many
of its local offices, and made substantial personnel shifts. In 1988, TRIC had been
operating 15 separate field offices and several regional offices that served as
intermediaries with the corporate office in Hartford. In March of 1990, what has been
referred to as "the big shake-up" occurred and all of the regional offices were eliminated:
"The choice was either to give more authority to the
regional offices or to do away with them. The move to centralize
was an effort to consolidate the regions and to allow more direct
reporting and better communication to support the home office's
decision making. With the elimination of all of the regional offices,
we removed an entire level of bureaucracy and flattened out our
hierarchy." 24
Several of the field offices were also closed over the next year and the remaining local
offices were functionally reorganized into four disciplines:
- New Business originated new real estate loans and consisted mostly of loan
officers with the requisite financial skills and lending experience.
- Investment Recovery Group (IRG) took responsibility for working with
troubled loans and investment assets.
" Asset Management/Property Management managed the firm's growing
REO portfolio and took care of daily operations, maintenance and leasing at
these properties.
- Property Sales marketed REO assets and sold properties both directly and
through brokers.
24 Interview with the Vice President and Manager of the Boston Office, Travelers Realty
Investment Management Inc., Boston, MA, July 13, 1992.
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The real estate markets, however, continued to decline and by March of 1991,
more changes were necessary. TRIC stopped making new real estate loans and the new
business department personnel was absorbed into the rest of the organization. (Travelers
continues to make purchase money mortgages to buyers of its REO assets.) The
Investment Recovery Group (IRG) was transformed into the Investment Management
Recovery Group (IMRG) in recognition that TRIC's biggest long-term challenge would
be to manage its expanding portfolio of troubled loans and equity assets.
TRIC is now organizationally structured to operate on a decentralized basis with
field offices that exhibit the characteristics of a professional bureaucracy. The firm's
division of labor is organized around functional generalists who must be proficient in a
range of technical and professional skills (i.e., financial, legal, analytical, and property
management skills). These functional generalists report to both a local office manager
and to a corporate office executive; this dual line of reporting helps to vertically integrate
TRIC's decentralized structure. Travelers Realty appears to be continuing the
centralization of its field operations and has plans to close additional offices, eventually
moving all non-corporate functions to only five local units in Dallas, Los Angeles,
Chicago, Hartford, and Atlanta. Loan portfolios are still being managed on a regionally
decentralized basis through these offices, but control and authority for most other
functions, including relatively low-level administrative functions, has been centralized.
The Boston office, for example, currently consists of a relatively small IMRG team, with
an office manager, three account officers who each handle a separate portfolio of loan
and workout accounts, two investment administrators who function as support staff for
the account officers, and two real estate coordinators that do secretarial work. While
functional responsibility is decentralized throughout TRIC's local office operations, the
firm appears to be centralizing authority to an even greater extent. All financial and
portfolio related decisions are made at the corporate level and even some of the
administrative authority is being centralized. The head of the Boston office, for instance,
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supervises only the three other account officers; the two investments administrators and
two real estate coordinators are managed from the Hartford office.
More strategic changes will lead to additional modifications in TRIC's
organizational structure. The New England region's asset management and REO
portfolio are now located in the Hartford office. The Boston office currently has no asset
managers since its entire portfolio consists of debt assets. Travelers is expecting to
increase the number of troubled loans on which it will foreclose in a strategic move to
take control of its workout situations. 25 To prepare for this challenge, TRIC plans to
move its regional asset management department to the Boston office on November 1,
1992. While most functions are becoming more centralized, effective asset management
depends heavily on local relationships and market knowledge. Moving this function out
of the Hartford office, therefore, may give the asset managers better management
capabilities.
Travelers Realty appears to have been impacted by the downturn in the real estate
markets. Part of its response has been to restructure its organization and, as offices were
reorganized or closed, this restructuring effort appears to have included a high incidence
of personnel moves and turnover. For instance, Travelers went outside of its own
organization to bring in a workout specialist, Allan Schuster from Citibank, to help
reorganize TRIC. This appears to have set the tone for the firm's restructuring. After the
real estate markets had started to deteriorate and TRIC's Boston office began to
experience large-scale trouble in its loan portfolio, three different office managers were
brought in within the course of an 18 month period. Similarly, of the four investment
managers in the Boston office, only one has been there since Allan Schuster took over the
firm in 1988. Personnel turnover is another example of the organizational restructuring
that has been taking place at TRIC.
25 Interview with the Vice President and Manager of the Boston Office, Travelers Realty
Investment Management Inc., Boston, MA, July 13, 1992.
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This continuing series of structural and strategic changes appears to have been
undertaken to allow Travelers Realty to redeploy its organizational resources to better
accommodate its workout and asset management focus. This continuing series of
incremental adaptations may be even more significant if it indicates that Travelers has
learned to employ a more evolutionary approach to its process of making organizational
change. A more continuous approach to instituting organizational change, however, is
dependent on the firm's ability to engage in higher-order forms of organizational
learning.
Most of the evidence of organizational learning found at the TRIC's Boston office
took the form of single-loop, error correction learning. Double-loop learning appears to
occur much less frequently and is primarily associated with the company's annual
portfolio review process. The firm exhibited some possible evidence of deutero-learning,
but it is unclear from the data gathered whether this highest-order form of learning
("learning to learn") is occurring. The data did show, however, that individuals at TRIC
engage in outcome-oriented single-loop learning almost daily as they perform their
respective functions. Loan officers recommend adjustments to keep healthy loans from
becoming troubled, property managers adjust spending to keep within budget, and sales
staff adjusts property prices to reflect changing market conditions. Each of these
examples represents a simple learning process that allows decisions to be made that
maintain the status quo. Through this type of "error correction" inquiry, the firm only
learns to do better what it already knows how to do. But to grow and evolve
organizations must look inward and engage in a higher-order reflective inquiry process
that allows them to question their fundamental values and normative processes.
Top management instituted an annual portfolio review process in 1989 that
requires each office to assemble an assessment of the real estate assets in its respective
portfolio. This was to be done in addition to a quarterly Investment Review Process
(IRP) that reported on the status of each loan in the local office's portfolio. Since its
Page 78
Chapter Three
inception, the portfolio review appears to have become one of the more comprehensive
organizational assessment tools used by TRIC to detect "errors" in its operations. Each
office is able to reflect on its previous year's achievements and failures:
"..Jt's a chance for us to take a break from putting out
fires and catch up on all current business. We get a macro view of
where we are and where things are going." 26
As a whole, the firm seems to devote substantial resources to this annual effort. Each
office spends about two full weeks assembling its respective portfolio review, suspending
all but the most urgent regular business, and then makes a presentation to top
management from the corporate office. The process appears to foster significant single-
loop learning as errors are detected and corrected. For instance, a summary status of each
loan is presented to the corporate office. If the performance of the loan or workout
situation is below standard, the corporate office has the opportunity to make changes or
suggest a new approach to dealing with the troubled asset.
The annual portfolio review requires substantial amounts of information. Each
office's portfolio review now includes a detailed description of all loans and assets, a
summary of market conditions, and a status report on operations that goes into such detail
as to include biographies of each staff member. More than being a way to brief
management on the financial status of each office's portfolio, the review serves as an
information sharing venue that has the potential to foster higher-order types of learning.
This process allows TRIC to take the time on an annual basis to reflect on its operations,
including both its structure and strategy. In this sense, the annual exercise is not only a
"review," but has the potential to be a more proactive "planning" process.
Robert Waterman, in his book The Renewal Factor, sums up the importance that
the planning and review process can play in helping companies to engage in reflective
26 Interview with an Investment Manager, Travelers Realty Investment Company, Boston, MA,
July 9, 1992.
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inquiry. He calls those firms that are able to question their fundamental organizational
processes "renewers":
The process of planning has multiple purposes; for many
the process was more important than the plan itself. While poking
good-natured fun at some of their own past plans that went awry,
the renewers seem to know how important the process can be in
generating information, in identifying issues, in improving
communications, in reinforcing the culture, in supporting the
financial control system, and in identifying possible crisis spots.27
TRIC's annual portfolio review gives the firm and its individuals the ability to come to
know their roles and their limitations better. Through this process, the organization has
the opportunity to focus on itself as much as its portfolio; individuals are given the
opportunity to reflect on the firm's way of doing business, it normative practices:
"We get to see how the entire office is functioning and get
to ask questions like, 'Are people jelling?,' 'How are people
working together?,' and 'Is there good teamwork?" 28
These are the types of reflective questions that can give the firm the ability to move
beyond simple single-loop, error correction learning. In the planning sense, the firm's
annual portfolio review has the potential to foster double-loop learning and to be a
powerful catalyst for organizational change.
Information sharing and reflective inquiry are necessary elements in the
organizational learning process, and similar potential for error correction and higher-
order learning appears to exist in the firm's other means of sharing information
throughout its decentralized structure. A company-wide computer network links all of
the local offices via the corporate headquarters. Information on an asset in any of the
firm's local office portfolios can be accessed "with 25 keystrokes of my computer." 29
27 Waterman, Robert H., Jr., The Renewal Factor, 1987, Bantam Books, pp. 6-7.
28 Interview with a Vice President, Travelers Realty Investment Company, Boston, MA, July 9,
1992.
29 Interview with an Investment Manager, Travelers Realty Investment Company, Boston, MA,
July 9, 1992.
Page 80
Chapter Three
The corporate office will also fill a request for asset information within 24 hours. In
addition, all local and corporate staff meeting minutes are written up an circulated to each
of TRIC's offices. These kinds of information sharing devices give individuals the
opportunity to access data that may add to their own limited sphere of experience. An
asset manager in one office, for instance, might find a more effective approach to
handling a troubled asset by reading another office's staff meeting minutes or accessing
asset performance data via the firm's computer network. In addition, these types of
information sharing vehicles give the firm the ability to track trends in its operations and
to get a more comprehensive understanding of how staff members are working together.
While these types of opportunities may simply lead to more error correction, they do
contribute to Travelers Realty's potential to engage in higher-order forms of
organizational learning. The firm's enhanced information sharing capabilities, therefore,
have the potential to bring about additional organizational inquiry and structural changes.
Since 1988 the firm has undertaken a continuing series of changes in its
organizational structure that appear to give it the ability to more effectively manage the
large numbers of troubles assets in its portfolio. Flattening out its hierarchy, redeploying
its resources, and enhancing its information sharing and planning processes seem to have
given TRIC the ability to better focus its business on workouts and asset management.
As the firm has made these incremental changes over the past few years, it may have
become more proficient in the reorganization process itself. Workers appear to be more
comfortable with the organizational restructuring strategy, the relatively high rate of
personnel turnover, and the somewhat unpredictable nature of the continuing
reorganization process:
"Our mission is clear and well-communicated from the top.
We are flexible and creative, and I have a good understanding of
the framework in which I can conduct my business." 30
30 Interview with the Vice President and Manager of the Boston Office, Travelers Realty
Investment Management Inc., Boston, MA, July 13, 1992.
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If this more evolutionary process of change has made individuals at Travelers Realty
more proficient at managing organizational learning and continuous change, the firm may
be engaging in deutero-learning, or the process of "learning to learn." More research data
collected over longer periods would be necessary to conclusively determine whether
individuals at TRIC are engaging in this highest-order form of organizational learning.
It does appear, however, that Travelers Realty's organizational restructuring
strategy has allowed it to take a more proactive approach to dealing with the large
numbers of troubled assets in its portfolio. In anticipation of an increase in the amount of
REO property in its portfolio as it accelerates the rate of foreclosures on its non-
performing loans, the firm already has plans to move its regional asset management office
to Boston. As TRIC becomes more proactive, as opposed to being merely reactive, it
may be able to gain more control over its troubled assets--despite the dynamic condition
of the real estate market. The firm may have begun its reorganization efforts in response
to its troubles, but now, rather than trying to maintain internal consistency in its
operations, TRIC appears to have made organizational change a strategic priority.
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CHAPTER FOuR
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS:
The Boston offices of Equitable Real Estate Investment Management Inc. and the
Travelers Realty Investment Company (TRIC) represent two institutional investment
firms from the same industry that appear to be pursuing different business strategies.
Equitable Real Estate, with only 6% of its assets classified as non-performing, has chosen
to maintain its internal consistency and to focus on improving the yield of its portfolio of
mostly performing assets. Equitable's choice to preserve its organizational status quo
allows it to project an image of stability while its parent company is in the process of
demutualizing to raise additional capital. Travelers Realty, in contrast, with 36% of the
investments in its real estate portfolio classified as non-performing, has undertaken a
strategy of restructuring its organization to allow it to more effectively manage its
workouts and troubled assets.
One possible explanation for the difference in these two firms' organizational
strategies is that each needed to pursue a different business focus. With few troubled
assets and no workouts in its portfolio, Equitable Real Estate's Boston office describes its
biggest challenges as asset management and new business production. Travelers Realty,
on the other hand, has had to focus on primarily workouts and asset management. (TRIC
officially stopped making new real estate investments in 1990.) Travelers has had to
make a more dramatic shift in its business focus which may have given it a greater need
to reorganize its resources. Such reorganization is necessary because the same technical
skills that a real estate investment firm uses to produce new business must be employed
in a different way when it undertakes workouts and asset management:
"Workouts are like 'reverse production.' The same
disciplines needed to originally structure a deal and create value
are required when those creations have to be put back together." 1
1 Interview with the Boston Regional Office Manager, Executive Vice President, Equitable Real
Estate Investment Management Inc., Boston, MA, June 17, 1992.
Page 83
Chapter Four
Travelers had the requisite skills, but appears to have felt compelled to make structural
changes that would allow it to more effectively deploy its organizational resources.
Restructuring may have allowed TRIC to reorganize its technical skills to better approach
its "reverse production" effort.
Both firms exhibited similar organizational structures with decentralized
professional bureaucracies and vertically integrated functional divisions. Equitable's
division of labor, however, was defined by functional disciplines (five separate
departments), while Travelers used functional generalists in its field offices. These
organizational structures seem to have been inherited from past incarnations of each
firm's real estate operations. While Traveler Realty has made a series of structural
changes, neither firm appears to have fundamentally questioned its organizational design
in light of the downturn in the real estate market. Further research might answer whether
a completely new organizational design would be more effective than a modification of
either firm's established structure.
After a series of structural changes and personnel moves, Travelers Realty appears
to have increased its organizational tolerance for change. Its Boston office has adapted to
an environment in which a relatively high rate of personnel turnover and office
reorganization is now the norm, almost to be expected. Equitable Real Estate, on the
other hand, has provided its staff with a more stable environment. Future data on both
firms' portfolio performance might reveal whether a greater tolerance for change can give
an institutional real estate investor a competitive advantage in a highly dynamic,
unpredictable real estate market.
Higher-order forms of organizational learning may also be able to give
institutional real estate investors a competitive advantage. "Learning organizations" have
the ability to make changes on a more evolutionary and proactive basis. While neither
Equitable nor Travelers exhibited explicit evidence of deutero-learning, both firms
appeared proficient in the error correction type of single-loop learning and both seemed
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to be able to periodically engage in double-loop learning. Of the two companies,
Travelers appeared to have greater potential to undertake higher-order forms of
organizational inquiry on a more frequent, but still inconsistent, basis. TRIC's annual
portfolio review was more participatory and gave individuals throughout all levels of the
firm's organizational structure the opportunity to collaboratively share information.
Equitable's annual business plan review required input from all functional disciplines, but
interdisciplinary collaboration did not appear to be a central element in its organizational
planning process. Interactive feedback and collaboration are key parts of the four-stage
learning cycle and TRIC's greater organizational information sharing capabilities may
give it greater potential to foster organizational learning. These learning characteristics
appear to be making the firm more proactive. TRIC shows signs of being able to make
proactive organizational changes, while Equitable has remained primarily reactive in its
organizational response to changing market conditions.
. CONCLUSIONS:
The analyses presented in this thesis offer suggestions to those institutional real
estate investment firms that are looking for ways to deal more effectively with their
troubled assets in a volatile market. The following are some conclusions and
recommendations:
Be more proactive in your approach to making organizational change:
It appears that the institutional real estate investment firms that have experienced
the most trouble also have had the greatest motivation to make organizational change.
Firms with large numbers of troubled assets may feel compelled to initiate organizational
change in order to redeploy their existing skills and resources to focus on workouts and
asset management. Other troubled firms may simply find themselves in a crisis
management mode and may make structural and strategic changes just because the status
quo is unworkable. In this sense, trouble seems to beget change.
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"Pain" may be great motivation for organizational change, but why wait until it
hurts to learn to adapt? Those institutional real estate investment firms that have
relatively few troubled assets in their portfolio have more of a choice. They can choose
to continue their relative "success" by maintaining consistency in their organizational
strategy and structure, and by merely learning to do better what they already know how to
do (i.e., engage in single-loop learning). Alternatively, these firms could choose to use
their relative success as an opportunity to devote organizational resources to making
proactive changes that may allow them to seek and pursue emerging opportunities and
may ultimately give them a competitive advantage. While allowances must be made for
other business considerations, all institutional real estate investors should understand that
stability and organizational consistency can only be short-term strategies in a market that
is by its very nature highly dynamic. An evolutionary approach to organizational change
can help even successful firms avoid unintentional obsolescence.
Encourage employees at all levels to participate in a regular organizational planning
process:
Annual planning (or "review") processes create regular opportunities for
individuals and groups to share information and to engage in single-loop and potentially
higher-order forms of organizational learning. Equitable Real Estate has used its
increased communications capability to primarily engage in single-loop, error correction
forms of organizational learning. Individuals at all levels of the firm do not engage in a
reflective form of organizational inquiry that calls into question the firm's fundamental
organizational practices and values. While this strategy has enabled Equitable to weather
the current real estate crisis with greater stability and consistency in its operations, it must
be wary of falling into a classic "competency trap." When market conditions improve,
the firm's future ability to compete and succeed may require an organizational strategy
that is more proactive with respect to change. A firm must be able to identify future
opportunities and must be able to avoid potential pitfalls. Those firms that make the
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effort to engage in higher-order forms of organizational learning can develop the ability
to evolve and to better understand and take advantage of changing market conditions:
They assume opportunity will keep knocking, but it will
knock softly and in unpredictable way. Their ability is to sense
opportunity where others can't, see it where others don't, act while
others hesitate, and demur when others plunge.2
Information sharing, however, is a necessary, but not sufficient element to foster higher-
order organizational learning. Even Travelers Realty, which has instituted an annual
portfolio review process that is much more participatory and gives virtually all of its staff
access to important organizational information, does not appear to regularly engage in
double-loop or deutero-learning. Organizational learning may be a more complex
process that also requires such things as continuous sharing of information, reflection,
interactive dialog, collaboration, creativity, and the license to fail.
Expect a healthy level offailure:
Firms that are committed to evolution and learning encourage their workers and
managers to use their own initiative, to be creative, to collaborate, and to experiment.
Organizations that strive to achieve the greatest learning ability in order to achieve long-
term objectives must be willing to make mistakes along the way. They must be ready,
therefore, to expect a healthy level of failure during the ongoing organizational process of
learning and change. In other words, it might take a few tries to get it right or to find that
better way. Short-term "failures" can often lead to long-term success.
2 Waterman, Robert H., Jr., The Renewal Factor, 1987, Bantam Books, p. 6.
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Learn to evolve and "learn to learn":
The firm that waits to restructure until external markets force such change upon
the organization may be allowing its productive capacity to suffer for extended periods.
A firm may be compromising its long-term success for short-term stability and
consistency when it opts for revolution over evolution. Firms can learn to evolve in order
to maximize their productive potential. Evolution, or continuous adaptation, is dependent
on a firm's ability to engage in higher-order types of learning. Those institutional real
estate investors that engage in double-loop learning and deutero-learning continuously
question and refine their organizational strategies and structures.
Learning, therefore, is a complex means of changing and renewing organizations.
Those institutional real estate investors that look for simpler answers will find only a
quick fix. Long-term solutions require thought, effort and action-a description of the
organizational learning cycle itself. In a world of constant change, learning and evolving
are more important than simply surviving. All institutional real estate investments firms,
including those that are relatively healthy and those that are troubled, can choose to take
control of their destiny:
"Dreams, not desperation, move organizations to the
highest levels of performance. Our dream ought to be institutions
that work for, not against, our needs. That is the hope, the power,
the dream, and the challenge in renewal." 3
Those organizations that inspire their employees to learn and to become better learners
have the best chance at realizing their collective potential.
A firm must be able to adapt to changes in its work and environment to meet
whatever unexpected challenges may arise. An organization must be open to change and
its members must be allowed--even encouraged--to question their most fundamental work
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processes and collective behaviors. More than simply being problem solvers, individuals
must engage in a process of learning that calls into question the very norms and structure
of their environment. If there is a better way, they must be allowed to search for it, to
invent, to experiment, to risk failure, and to engage in a richer learning process that
allows them to continuously re-create their organization. This higher-order learning has
the potential to produce innovation and those firms that truly understand the potential
benefits, both in terms of human achievement and competitive advantage, will facilitate
the learning process. They will actively encourage their members to learn and to become
better learners.
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